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ABSTRACT 
 
Contemporary theorists of religion have argued that religious beliefs are “natural” 
because they arise from normally functioning social cognitive capacities, especially Theory of 
Mind (ToM). Hence, attempts to explain atheism have relied heavily on the assumption that 
nonbelievers may have a malfunctioning ToM and other traits associated with the autism 
spectrum continuum (ASC). However, few studies currently address this topic and the evidence 
either way remains ambiguous. The current research narrows this empirical gap, addressing these 
claims with a two-fold approach. First, a near comprehensive review of ToM is provided. 
Second, this study is exploratory, employing a unique methodology and previously untapped 
empirical measures to test for differences in ToM components and ASC traits between atheists 
(N = 2423) and theists (N = 103).  
Keywords: theory of mind; cognitive science of religion; evolutionary psychology; atheism; 
religion  
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CHAPTER I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, 
together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man 
would naturally crave to understand what was passing around him, and would 
have vaguely speculated on his own existence….Nevertheless I cannot but 
suspect that there is a still earlier and ruder stage, when anything which 
manifests power or movement is thought to be endowed with some form of life, 
and with mental faculties analogous to our own.  – Charles Darwin “The Descent 
of Man” (1871, p. 64)  
 
 
When it comes to the topic of vague speculation over the existence of humans, Darwin 
was clearly on to something. However, cognitive scientists might not postulate a specific 
“faculty” as Darwin did for “imagination, wonder, curiosity, and reasoning.” Nonetheless, 
collectively these entities fall under a broad category cognitive scientists do utilize, the social 
brain. And in the spirit of Darwin’s passage, the social brain is rooted in this earlier, “ruder,” 
stage, when the brain began—much as it continues today—to attribute human agency and 
intentionality onto the ever changing environment. Animism is one of the oldest traits found in 
hunter-gatherer societies (Peoples, Duda, & Marlowe, 2016). This attribution of agency and 
intentionality has been highly adaptive, transporting homo sapiens into the cognitive niche we 
occupy at present (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Pinker, 2010). Along with the capabilities 
endowed to us by our social brains, however, comes several by-products, three of which are 
highlighted: Autism, psychoses, and religion.   
The topic of this thesis—differences in religiosity and the social brain— is informed by 
the greater discipline of the cognitive sciences and cognitive science of religion in particular. The 
terms religion, religious, religious belief, belief in gods, and other supernatural agents, are used 
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interchangeably throughout and shall refer to the explicit acknowledgment of and commitment to 
the proposition that there is exists some form of external, conscious, mental, agency, that is 
concerned with human affairs. Chapter-by-chapter, this thesis is an additive process, it should be 
read as a series of graduated steps, descent with modification—if you will—until the mental 
systems of interest have been sufficiently characterized to cast the broadest possible light on the 
role of theory of mind (ToM) in supernatural (non)belief.  
The initial sections characterize an evolutionary account of two key aspects of social 
cognition—causal cognition and joint intentionality (see Chapter II)—which is helpful for 
elucidating the structure and functioning of two important (but largely overlapping) theoretical 
accounts of ToM—the “theory of mind mechanism” and the “mindreading system” (see Chapter 
III). When theory of mind is discussed in relation to cognitive science of religion, it shall refer to 
the cognitive processes described by these two theories. Chapter IV reviews how theory of mind 
and related constructs, such as traits characterized by the autism spectrum continuum have been 
measured, before moving on to discuss variability and stability in theory of mind development 
and functioning across cultures, within different contexts, and among clinical populations (see 
Chapter V). Chapter VI reviews how folk psychology and its variability—which concerns the 
higher level functioning of theory of mind—may relate to belief in supernatural agents. Chapter 
VII, formally introduces the cognitive sciences of religion and the centrality of theory of mind 
for explaining belief in these agents, discussing research relevant to the experimental aspects of 
one key question: Do atheists and theists differ on basic socio-cognitive tendencies in 
explanation for their belief or nonbelief in supernatural agents? Chapter VIII discusses the 
diversity of nonbelief research and the remaining chapters present an empirical study testing for 
ToM differences in atheists and believers.  
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CHAPTER II. 
 
ORIGINS OF THEORY OF MIND IN HUMAN EVOLUTION 
 
 
Imagine you are playing billiards, a game of Eight-Ball with your friends. As you aim 
and then release your billiard cue, taking the final shot, the pool cue strikes the cue-ball, which 
strikes the eight-ball, launching it smoothly into the corner pocket. As you boast about this 
victory to your opponent, you both appreciate the fact that one of you has won the game, while 
the other has lost. The ability to sink the eight-ball in the corner pocket and the very fact that you 
even have a friend to engage in both cooperative (you are playing by the rules after all) and 
competitive (but you’re still out to win) behavior with are rooted in our everyday social 
cognition. Specifically, this consist of causal cognition and joint intentionality.  
 
Origins of Causal Cognition  
One key ingredient to ToM is discerning causality. Causality pertains to conditional 
reasoning, such that the agent can link one or more representations with another representation in 
the form of if X, then Y. Understanding causal relations between entities—the ability to link a 
given action, event, or thought, with another—is highly adaptive (Gopnik, 1993; Stuart-Fox, 
2015a). While ToM has been variously conceived of as a module (Baron-Cohen, 1995), 
mechanism (Leslie, 1994b), or even a network (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015), all 
accounts include causal reasoning within this domain. Particularly as this relates to other 
conspecifics, understanding causal relationships allows for the exchange of complex social 
information (Sperber, 1994, 2000). For example, that, if Grog hits Thak, then Thak may hit 
Grog, keep him away from the day’s meat ration, or perhaps even begin to build alliances against 
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him within their group. Obviously the combinations of information that can be linked in this way 
are potentially innumerable and although this is suggested to have been key for social cohesion 
and the development of culture in anatomically modern Homo sapiens, this ability has 
developmentally earlier roots (Dunbar, 2004; Kurzban & Barrett, 2012; Mithen, 1996).
 Sometime between 6-8 million years ago lived the last common ancestor (LCA) shared 
by modern day humans and chimpanzees (Steiper & Young, 2006). This LCA has yet to be 
taxonomized and we know only little about early hominids such as Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and 
Ardipithecus (approximately 7-4 million years ago [MYA]). The past ten million years of 
hominin evolution saw the development of the very things humans today take for granted today: 
“bipedalism, large brains, extended life histories, complex social cognition, and the amplification 
of technology” (Gamble, 2013, p. 33). One key aspect of this complex social cognition, also 
known as theory of mind, was the capacity for casual reasoning (Baron-Cohen, 1999; Leslie, 
1994b). While there is no crystal clear window to peer through in revisiting our evolutionary 
deep history, proceeding cautiously, an informed picture can arise illuminating the origins of 
causal reasoning. And while many animals have mechanisms designed to take advantage of the 
statistical regularities of causality, the human ability to do this clearly stands out (Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007).  
The early hominids were bipedal and lived in woodland environments, however canopy 
coverage was widely distributed and forays into more open grassland environments were likely 
prevalent (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; White, Lovejoy, Asfaw, Carlson, & Suwa, 2015). Beginning 
slightly before Homo split from Pan and continuing into recent history, the climate patterns of 
East Africa have demonstrated considerable variation (Maslin, Shultz, & Trauth, 2015). Climate 
variability has played a large role in applying adaptive pressure to hominid evolution in response 
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to shifting environmental demands (Maslin et al., 2015; Reed, 1997). Adept at locating fruits and 
other food in the forest canopy, one of early hominids (and today’s homo sapiens) best cognitive 
faculties was the visual system (Kaas, 2006, 2013; Stuart-Fox, 2015a). As the climate varied, 
food demands waned and waxed, leading to a selective advantage for spatial memory systems 
capable of mapping terrain, sources of food, and eventually stored food caches (Byrne, 1999; 
Coolidge & Wynn, 2009).  
Although this increase in territorial range clearly had advantages, it also opened up early 
hominids to new predators (Gamble, 2013; Liebenberg, 1990). Thus, increased threat of 
predation came from multiple sources, and mechanisms designed to extract every possible source 
of information from one’s environment about the possibility of a threat would be highly 
adaptive. Many species in the animal kingdom receive information from their environment and 
other agents in the form of natural signs (Owren, Rendall, & Ryan, 2010; Stuart-Fox, 2015a). 
The scent of blood, for example, relays information about a possible source of food for sharks. 
And, male birds-of-paradise engage in elaborate displays of colorful plumage in attempt to signal 
its readiness to mate to another female. These two natural signs (PREY, MATE; among many 
others), depend on being automatically interpreted as they are produced. Without hesitation, for 
example, once an odorant has entered the shark’s left or right nostril, the olfactory system 
immediately registers PREY. Almost instantaneously, this signal is relayed to the motor system, 
and like a missile homing in on its target, the shark’s body is propelled in the direction of the 
scent (Gardiner & Atema, 2010). Thus, in order to track prey an animal must make and maintain 
contact with a particular stimulus array—it must be perceptually coupled to its target. In contrast, 
there is another class of natural signs that are mediated via the environment. These signs can 
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persist long after the sign maker has left, hence do not require direct agent-to-target coupling for 
their interpretation (Stuart-Fox, 2015a).   
Natural signs, such as a claw mark on a tree or finding a mostly de-fleshed animal carcass 
would have relayed an important source of visual information, being highly adaptive to detect for 
early hominids coming under increasing threat of predation (Glenberg, 1997; Liebenberg, 1990). 
Due to increasing memory capacity driven by foraging associated with environmental pressures 
(Coolidge & Wynn, 2009), what Stuart-Fox terms (2015a) “incipient working memory,” these 
hominids likely had the capacity to hold two mental representations in mind—just enough for a 
cause and effect relationship to take root.  
“The defining characteristic of visible indirect natural signs is that they have been 
produced through prior behavior of some animal that is no longer visible” (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, p. 
253).  A plausible scenario is as follows: hominids tracking, (or being chased by large prey) 
detect an animal scurry into a small cave. At the base of this cave entrance are tracks left by the 
animal. The hominid registers these tracks, that animal. Whether it is disturbed foliage, blood on 
a leaf, or a smilodon’s urine on a rock, the basic conceptual categories of PREDATOR and PREY 
(Allen, 1999; Gallistel, 1989) are innately linked in species. However, unlike most other species, 
as Stuart-Fox suggests, hominid’s innate propensity for curiosity, mixed with a constantly 
shifting environment with multiple threats, tuned the beginnings of causal cognition to a hair-
trigger, yet also selected for great flexibility in their application. However, it was the extraction 
of this visual information detached from its source and consolidated into a single conceptual 
category, in which learning to make connections between “categories of signs to the categories 
that made them” would have been an extremely beneficial adaptation (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, p. 
252).  
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The ability to connect representations in the mind, and work backwards—through several 
signs—to establish causation is a uniquely human ability. Causal cognition is the foundation 
upon which many higher order, distinctively human, behaviors rest. However, while it appears 
necessary for consciousness it is by no means sufficient. The use of information provided by 
these visible indirect natural signs is what drove hominin evolution further apart from its forest 
ape cousins (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, 2015b). Of course, it is due to many factors coalescing and 
accruing over time, not just one ability per se, that ultimately come together to support human 
uniqueness in certain domains.  
 
Oldowan and Acheulean Industries: Implications for Joint Intentionality  
While causal reasoning may have been some of the first cognitive processes to utilize a 
representation that was detached from the thing it represented, the capability to use and combine 
representations in a flexible manner was further driven by the production of tools (Suddendorf, 
1999). The archaeological records reveal rich insight into the cognitive capabilities of our 
ancestors beginning around 2.5MYA. The habitats of these hominins consisted of an eclectic mix 
of biodiversity and evidence of tool use and butchery accompanies this diversity. Roughly 2 
MYA at the Olduvai Gorge in what is now Tanzania, for example, there is geographical, 
archaeological, and biomarker evidence for a varied landscape, consisting of a freshwater spring 
bordered by a rich variety of wetland plants and a wooded forest area surrounded by open 
grasslands, with numerous deposits of animal bones etched with cut marks (Magill, Ashley, 
Domínguez-Rodrigo, & Freeman, 2016).  
Adept at basic causal reasoning, tracking small prey and scavenging were critical survival 
activities of hominids during this time. However, once you locate a tuber you have to be able to 
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dig it up, and if you find a mammoth carcass you won’t be sitting quietly by its side snacking. 
Other larger animals, are likely also vying for the same meat, and the capability to take meat 
with you certainly has its advantages (Gamble, 2013; Wynn, 2002). Tool manufacture and use 
were of critical importance in the Lower Paleolithic and can divulge further secrets about the 
origins of a ToM system (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; Mithen, 1996).  
While the “first tool” may have come from discovering a broken rock with a sharp edge 
made for easier digging or butchering of meat, the best tools, and indeed even rudimentary tools 
are not made by accident. The intentional production of tools by striking one rock against 
another in order to affect its shape is called knapping. Although there has never been a natural 
documented case of primates flaking of stone tools, the percussive motions involved in striking 
with a rock have been documented and it is likely that very early hominids were capable of this 
(Haslam et al., 2009; Roux & Bril, 2005).  
The appearance of Oldowan tools speaks to the increasing reliance on a diet of meat by 
our ancestors.  The earliest tools, known as the Oldowan industry, were made of small pebbles 
that had been struck by another rock to reveal a sharp edge. These tools were likely made on 
demand, as needed, used for butchering a carcass, and then discarded. Wynn (2002, p. 395) 
describes these early tools as “ad hoc technology,” noting that “it is unlikely that they existed as 
tools in the minds of the knappers.”  
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Figure 1 Example of Oldowan “pebble technology” by José-Manuel Benito Àlvarez, 1987, via 
Wikimedia Commons. Used under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 
Generic license 
 
 
To be sure, there are discrepancies within the literature as to the interpretation of the 
archaeological evidence (Lycett & Chauhan, 2010). For example, Toth and Schick (2009), 
perhaps speaking of later Oldowan industries, suggest that these tools were carried form location 
to location, and even certain rock types were selected for. Hence, this indicates the appearance of 
more complex cognitive capabilities, such as planning and foresight.  
Strikingly, stone tools remained relatively unchanged in form from 2.5—1.5MYA. 
However, beginning around 1.5MYA up until around 500,000 years ago, in what is known as the 
Acheulean industry, stone tools began to exhibit increasing levels of complexity. For example, 
rather than appearing as merely sharp rock fragments upon first glance, as much of the Oldowan 
industry could be mistaken for, Acheulean technology begins to show the hallmarks of design 
that is clearly intentional (Wynn, 2002). These tools, often known as “bi-faces” in reference to 
their apparent symmetry, required the tool maker to hold a representation of the final product in 
their mind while actively constructing this tool.  
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Figure 2 Example of a biface Acheulean hand Axe by José-Manuel Benito, 2002 via Wikimedia 
Commons, Public Domain 
 
 
Thus, and in referring back to incipient working memory (Stuart-Fox, 2015a), at this 
point in evolution our Homo ancestors had the ability to hold 2 goal representations (or more) in 
working memory at once (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009). However, and missing from the early 
evolution of causal cognition, these later hominids were able to utilize this multi representational 
capacity with directed self-attention. In other words, rather than relationships between natural 
signs and their responses being automatic, the ability to begin to attentively direct, inhibit, or 
apply new category relationships was likely developing during this time. Attention and goal 
directed mental states are key—one cannot hit a rock just anywhere, and with any amount of 
force, and expect an Acheulean hand axe to be produced. Aside from the attentional resources, 
and finely tuned motor capabilities evidenced by tool production (Faisal, Stout, Apel, & Bradley, 
2010), Acheulean tool production required cooperation. Producing these more complex tools 
required using a prepared “core” and a special “hammer stone.” The core was prefabricated to 
fracture along points in the rock, flaking off a sharper edge when struck with the hammerstone. 
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There are many sites scattered throughout the world with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of both 
used and unused cores, hammers, and finished hand axes. Tool making was a large industry. This 
was far from a solitary operation of lone tool makers and our hominid ancestors had not yet 
developed the vocal and cognitive capabilities to produce the syntax required for the generativity 
inherent in human language (Dunbar, 2004).  Instead of language, this cooperation speaks to the 
unique human ability of joint attention (J. L. Barrett, 2011; Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; Tomasello, 
2014). Joint attention is the ability to form a triadic representation in the mind of an individual, 
such that, I know that you know that we are both attending to the same subject [either an object 
or perhaps a mental state (Baron-Cohen, 1995)]. Our ancestors used joint attention to guide the 
shaping of rocks into highly specialized tools. When we see another conspecific, in most cases, 
our joint attention is automatically activated. For example, if we happen to notice even a 
complete stranger starring up at the afternoon sky, our attention shifts to become more in-line 
with theirs, in attempt to attend to the same perceived object or event, we look up to figure out 
what they’re looking at. We interpret their behavior in terms of underlying goals and intentions 
to act (people don’t accidentally stare at the sky). But for our ancestors, one can easily imagine 
Homo erctus or heidelbergensis (or a modern day brick mason) using protodeclarative gestures 
to indicate  what rocks were to be used in manufacturing the tools and what were to be discarded 
(Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Furthermore, joint attention is key to the process of knapping 
itself. It facilitates a “do this” or “copy me” directive (Shipton & Nielsen, 2015) which in the 
absence of verbal communication is only possible by two or more conspecifics sharing attention 
at an event or object. But to reiterate, Homo sapiens often go beyond mere copying or imitation, 
when we see another human engaged in some kind of (in)action “we ask why, or to what end” 
(H. C. Barrett, 2015).  
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CHAPTER III. 
 
THEORY OF MIND MECHANISMS 
 
 
Causal cognition and joint intentionality form key aspects of ToM.  The two theories of 
ToM discussed here provide mechanistic characterizations of the relationship between these 
aspects. Mechanistic characterization of the interplay between thought processes within a 
complex system allows for specific subcomponents to be identified in a hierarchical fashion 
(Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). That is to say, you can look at parts of the “mind,” how they are 
organized, and based on that, they will be organized in some ways and not others. Although 
these two theories of ToM largely overlap, I discuss them both because they have provided the 
dominant characterization of ToM as a mechanism or “module” in ToM research in general and 
this approach has also largely guided the evolutionary cognitive sciences of religion, in specific 
(J. W. Jones, 2016). Additionally, in this study I connect shared elements of these theories, 
empirically testing some of their component parts in relation to supernatural belief. Theories of 
ToM emphasizing its development as conceptual change or re-description, often known as 
“theory theories” (Gelman & Legare, 2011; Gopnik, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, 1995), receive only 
little discussion here, as they describe a change in ToM performance and not the discovery of 
new conceptual information (Caron, 2009; Goldman, 2012; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; 
Scholl & Leslie, 1999).  
 
Leslie’s Theory of Agency  
Leslie (1987, 1994b) provides a hierarchal model of how agency is represented and 
processed by postulating two distinct cognitive modules with sub processing mechanisms (see 
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also Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Contained within these modules are three specific, 
interrelated, domains of knowledge about Agency: mechanical, actional, and attitudinal. These 
domains constitute our universal, evolutionary endowed, cognitive architecture, which forms the 
basis for learning and can be traced back (in part) to recurring properties of the world (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 2000, 2008). Combined, they are considered “core 
knowledge,” forming the basis by which cultural learning can proceed (Carey, 2011; Sperber & 
Hirschfeld, 1999, 2004). The notion of “Agency,” is a core concept derived from these two 
modules, referring exclusively to objects capable of, or involved in, what appears as causation 
(Leslie, 1994b). The actional and attitudinal domains of Agency constitute the Theory of Mind 
Mechanism (ToMM) and the mechanical domain constitutes the Theory of Body mechanism 
(ToBy).1  
 
Table 1 Core architecture for the cognition of Agency (adapted from Leslie, 1994b, p. 122) 
 
A Tripartite Theory of Agency 
Real World Properties of 
Agents 
Processing Device 
Levels of Understanding or 
“theories” 
mechanical ToBy “Agents and Objects” 
actional ToMM (system1) “Agents and Action” 
cognitive ToMM (system2) “Agents and Attitudes” 
X 
Selection Processor (SP) 
“rear end” of the ToMM 
Learning mechanism 
responsible for creating 
“theories” 
 
 
                                                 
1It is worth pointing out that Leslie’s three domains of Agency closely follow Dennett’s (1987) distinctions between 
the “design stance,” the “intentional stance,” and the “physical stance.” This indicates what basic categories Leslie’s 
tripartite theory consist of. This is in part, because both rely on folk psychological assumptions in lieu of positions, 
for example, such as eliminative materialism, which view folk psychological states (beliefs and desires) as a 
radically false foundation for a science of the mind (Churchland, 1981, 1993, 2007).  
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Theory of Body Mechanism 
Due to its privileged operating position within cognitive structure, ToBy is the first 
mechanism within Leslie’s Theory of Agency. For a helpful analogy, imagine individuals 
(Agents) trying to get into a night club; they will have to pass through the bouncer at the door. In 
a sense, ToBy can be thought of as the “night club bouncer” of the ToMM—no Agent gets in 
without going through ToBy. The ToBy is a module targeting purely mechanical, causal 
relationships, between bounded, spatiotemporal objects in the world.  For example, the launching 
of one billiard ball as a result of colliding with another. ToBy can be activated not only from 
visual information, but also via haptic and kinesthetic sensation. When a cause and effect 
relationship of this type is detected through motion by ToBy, it activates the “primitive” concept 
of FORCE (Leslie, 1994b). Whereas we would properly say there was a transfer of energy 
between the billiard balls occurring “in the world,” FORCE can be thought of as the “cognitive 
correlate of energy” (p. 125, italics in original). FORCE, which concerns the movement and 
spatiotemporal arrangement of objects, interprets these “objects in terms of the sources and fates 
– the dynamics – of FORCE” (Leslie, 1987, p. 128). It is worth briefly pointing out, but will be 
described in greater depth later on, that the relationship described between objects, by FORCE, 
understood broadly as agent detection, constitutes an important source of explanans for 
supernatural belief within CSR (J. L. Barrett, 2004, 2012; Bering, 2006, 2011; Boyer, 2001, 
2003; Guthrie, 1995; Guthrie et al., 1980; McCauley, 2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Xygalatas, 
2014). 
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Theory of Mind Mechanism  
The mechanical properties of Agents set them apart from non-Agents. The ToMM 
identifies certain classes of objects as Agents, as being motivated by goal state. For example,  
infant studies demonstrate that human hand reach indicates special mechanical, agentive, 
attributes when compared to movement using a square block or even a mechanical claw with 
digits (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Leslie, 1984; Woodward, 1998). Thus the movement of 
objects can trigger ToBy (this is why the infants responded at all to the hand, block, and claw 
instead of staring blankly). However, with the arrival of the ToMM, infants begin to treat some 
objects as being guided by goals. Once ToBy identifies an object as an Agent, the ToMM is 
needed to describe the relationship between the goal states of the Agent and the given action. 
There are two sub-systems to the ToMM and system1 introduces the concept of “ACTING,” 
(Leslie, 1994b, p. 139), described as “ACTING to obtain X,” or to work so as to bring about a 
specific state of affairs and not some other. Importantly, Leslie (1994b) notes that the structure of 
an ACTING or a desire is not represented propositionally, they can be neither true nor false, they 
simply are (see also Hutto, 2008; Malle, 2004). In this sense, ACTING is similar to a 
behavioristic explanation, only discussed in terms of dispositions and drives. Developmentally, 
with the activation of this rule, desire psychology is enabled (Bach, 2014), and infants 
understand that Agents act with intentionality (for a review, see Caron, 2009).  
System2 of the ToMM develops slightly later and with its arrival comes the ability to 
represent thoughts propositionally, as either true or false (Leslie, 1994b). At this stage, full 
blown “belief-psychology” is possible. The ToMM introduces both the concept of pretending 
and the concept of believing.2 Individuals now understand that other Agents not only act based 
                                                 
2 Other accounts of ToM postulate that beliefs and pretends are represented quite differently from one another (e.g. 
Perner, 1991).  
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on desires, but that beliefs are a motivating force in the generation of behavior and that Agents 
can both deceive and be deceived. As will be discussed next, the representations processed by a 
fully functioning ToMM have special characteristics that set them apart from other 
representations.  
 
Selection Processor  
Most humans assume others are guided by true beliefs. The concepts of belief and desire 
(mental state concepts) represent the relationship between an agent’s attitude toward an object or 
situation. These relationships are called “informational relations” in virtue of the content they 
can be said to represent (i.e., what is the belief/thought about?) and permit learning the deeper 
aspects of social cognition, such as the fact that others may be guided in their behavior by false 
beliefs, are subject to intentional deception, and also have the capacity to intentionally deceive. 
However, these deeper aspects of social cognition also require more than the implicit or explicit 
understanding of the mental states concepts provided by the ToMM. They draw on resources 
such as memory and executive functioning in order to select the relevant belief contents (Leslie, 
1994a, 2000; Leslie et al., 2005). Leslie suggests a domain-general mechanism, the selection 
processor (SP), a mechanism of “selective attention” (Leslie, 2000), is the final system to 
develop in the ToMM, creating the ToMM-SP.  
 The typical false-belief task requires the participant be able to override their default 
assumptions about beliefs—that they are always true—and chose that the other individual 
actually has a belief that is false. This means that typical false-belief tasks make extra demands 
on EF that can mask performance, as the child has to select the proper belief by a process of 
inhibiting the “true belief” (Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie, 2000). Additionally, when the 
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demands of the false-belief task are loosened to ask “where will Sally look for her toy first,” 
instead of “where will Sally believe her toy is at,” children are able to pass the test at a much 
younger age. Looking helps calculate belief (Leslie, 2000).  
 The SP enables the child to move beyond the tacit understanding of belief provided by 
the ToMM, and towards learning about a wide array of more specific mental states (e.g., 
sadness), their implications for behavior (e.g., sad people might isolate), and how one might 
respond in kind (e.g., comfort sad people). Thus, the SP “colors in” and contextualizes the basic 
informational relation provided by the concept of belief and desire. This will be an important 
point to keep in mind as the discussion of ToM moves from mechanisms to deployment as an 
adult embedded in a world of supernatural agent concepts and beliefs.  
 
Meta-representations 
According to Leslie (1987, 1994a, 1994b), the ToMM operates using specialized 
representations. Primary representations are transparent, they stand in direct semantic 
relationship to a perceptual state of affairs in the world and can be either true or false (e.g., This 
is a banana. That is a telephone.). In contrast, Meta-representations (M-representations) are 
derived from primary representations, however decoupled from their referent, they are opaque 
and lack conditions for veridicality (Bloch, 2008; Leslie, 1994a). M-representations allow for 
pretense, which is an early version of a full blown ToM (Leslie, 1987; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). By blending two or more primary representations, one can pretend to have, for example, 
“a banana that is also a telephone.” Thus, M-representations are representations of 
representations (Leslie, 1987; Sperber, 1994, 2000). That these representations are decoupled, or 
bracketed off from strict logical truth relations, is critically important in the case of M-
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representations. This prevents the application of a primary representation in absurd ways, what 
Leslie (1987, p. 417) terms “representational abuse,” such as when one pretends an empty cup 
contains water. By necessity an empty cup cannot contain something, unless the representational 
context of pretense is specified. Thus, all M-representations are tagged within the context of 
pretense, acting “As-if.” This process of adding a “tag” to the representation allows for a single 
representational code to function logically in switching back and forth between primary thought 
and pretense. Because our folk psychology is always fallible (i.e., representing mental states 
opens up the possibility of mis-representation, as in the case of a false-belief), mental state 
representations are prima facie M-representations (J. L. Barrett, 2011; Leslie, 1987; Sperber, 
2000; Suddendorf, 1999).  
Leslie’s (1994b) theory of Agency, containing ToBy, ToMM-SP, and M-representations, 
is one of the earliest full models attempting to account for how mind and behavior reading is 
computed. It is important to note that Leslie’s account, indeed almost all accounts of theory of 
mind, focus almost exclusively on accounting for this capacity in infants and children as it 
develops, and have comparatively little to say about ToM in adults or even teens (Apperly, 2012, 
2013). This is important to keep in mind, because as an individual grows up, becomes 
enculturated, experiencing and entering in to a wide array of increasingly complex social 
relationships with multiples levels of intentionality (Dunbar, 2004), discussing ToM, too, 
becomes incredibly complex (Whiten, 2013). Nonetheless, Leslie’s theory of Agency serves as 
the starting point for discussing the theories of mental architecture responsible for the structure 
of mind reading.  
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Baron-Cohen’s Mindreading System 
Baron-Cohen’s (1995, 1999) account of mindreading closely parallels Leslie’s (1994a, 
1994b) version. For example, both conclude that recurring properties of the world should be 
reflected (in part) in an evolved cognitive modular architecture. Thus many of the component 
sub-mechanisms of each theory of mind overlap (e.g., detecting intentionality). Both rely heavily 
on developmental studies and suggest that the primary factor responsible for the autism spectrum 
continuum is an impairment in the ToM system (Baron-Cohen, 1987, 1995, 2009; Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie, 1987, 1994a). However, it is worth discussing some of the key 
differences, as well as briefly drawing direct comparisons between some of the constructs of 
each.  
Baron-Cohen’s (1995, p. 32) “mindreading system” describes four hierarchally arranged 
sub-mechanisms: Intentionality Detector (ID); Eye Detection Device (EDD); Shared Attention 
Mechanism (SAM); Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM).  
 
 
Figure 3 The Theory of Mind Mechanism  
 
SAM
EDD
ToMM
ID
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Intentionality Detector  
The ID is a perceptual, supramodal mechanism, which tags anything that is registered as 
“non-random sound” self-propelled and directional stimuli as “AGENT” – attributing goals and 
desires (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 34). Importantly, this device will accept anything that is agent-
like, thus its actual domain is much larger than its proper domain (c.f., Sperber, 1994; Sperber & 
Hirschfeld, 2004). Similar to Leslie’s (1994b) overall theory of agency, the input parameters for 
detecting intentionality are “set fairly loosely” (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 35). As will demonstrated 
later, this point is of critical concern in discussing CSR and belief/nonbelief, considering Baron-
Cohen notes that false positives, such as mistaking a cloud for an agent (e.g., (e.g., Guthrie, 
1995), should be overridden given proper experience and background knowledge (Ibid).  
On Baron-Cohen’s (1995) account, the function of the ID, detecting intentionality, is 
conceptually similar to a blend of Leslie’s (1994b) ToBy and ToMM1. The first comparison lies 
in how both ToBy and the ID are attempts at generating a structural description of things in the 
external world by “picking out objects.” Detecting movement is critical to both, however ToBy’s 
evolved function is concerned prima facie with separating agents from non-agents and describing 
the mechanical relationships of physical objects, it does not interpret these relationships as 
intentional (i.e., goal driven). However, according to Baron-Cohen (1995, p. 35), the ID has been 
structured exclusively for the “social or animate world,” and hence does interpret representations 
in intentional terms, even of non-agents. Subsequently this is also why the ID shares functions 
with Leslie’s ToMM1—by having access to goal-desire concepts. In summary, the differences 
that are suggested to exist between the ID, ToBy, and ToMM1 appear superficial at most and, if 
there are differences, these may not be the kind of differences that make a difference (c.f., 
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Kodish, 2012). For example, in what has been relegated to an endnote in Mindblindness, Baron-
Cohen (1995, p. 146) states “…one possibility is that ID may be a submodule of ToBy.”  
 
Eye Detection Device 
“Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes,” goes the famous battle cry issued by a 
General during the Battle of Bunker Hill, in order to ensure each shot fired met its target. 
Interestingly, humans are the only primates to have a white sclera surrounding their pupil 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Emery, 2000). “The whites of their eyes” are not so much for targeting 
bullets to your neighbor’s head, as they are for targeting mental state information about your 
neighbor’s head. Detecting and responding to eyes, or simply spots that look like eyes, is found 
across animal taxa, has an extremely deep evolutionary homology, stretching back “tens of 
millions of years” (Janzen, Hallwachs, & Burns, 2010, p. 11659).3  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For a technical discussion of whether or not animal eyespots really mimic eyes, see Stevens (Stevens & Ruxton, 
2014) and (Stevens, Hardman, & Stubbins, 2008). Regardless of whether this counts as actual mimicry of eye spots, 
or things that look like eye spots, they carry valuable information that animals detect and respond to.   
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Figure 4 Examples of animal “eye spots” from left to right, Papilip troilus larva / by poppy2323/ 
CC BY-NC 3.0; Pavo cristatus / by Worm That Turned / CC SA-3.0; Pelvicachromis 
taeniatus / Public Domain; Caligo Oedipus / by D. Gordon E. Robertson / CC SA-3.0 
 
 
Both Baron-Cohen (1995, 1999) and McCauley (2011) suggest a special device (although 
not special to humans) for the detection of eyes. There is growing support for the convergent 
evolution of this ToM component in corvids and apes (Bugnyar, Reber, & Buckner, 2016; Emery 
& Clayton, 2004). The EDD’s only input is from the visual system. It has three tasks: targeting 
eyes or eye like stimuli, registering eye gaze, and, based on the first person perspective, 
computing whether or not the other agent has the mental state of a SEEING.  
In contrast to the ID, which computes representations in terms of goals and desires (agent 
wants X), the EDD’s representational options are limited to a game of peekaboo: “see’s me” and 
agent “doesn’t see me.” Both of these mechanisms function to produce dyadic representations. 
However, the ID and EDD on their own cannot produce the rich “shared” representations that 
characterize more advanced ToM.  
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 Shared Attention Mechanism  
Using the mental state representations produced by ID and EDD, the shared attention 
mechanism (SAM) produces triadic representations (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Thus the SAM accepts 
information from any modality. However, SAM has a privileged relationship with EDD, due to 
the centrality of vision for navigating our world, it is simply easier to draw information about 
mental states through visual access than, say, haptic sensation (Ibid). SAM builds representations 
such that, one can register: I see Ralph looking (perceptual mental state) at the snake. Thus the 
agent can attend to the fact that another agent is attending to another fact: I know that you know. 
The SAM takes EDD’s seeings and typically interprets them in terms of a goal or desire. For 
example, I may see Ralph looking at the snake, but I will also be looking for the nature of his 
dyadic representation with the snake: Is Ralph scared to see this snake or excited? Clearly SAM 
reveals rich information, however more is needed before the mind reading system is able to 
handle propositional thought.  
 
Theory of Mind Mechanism  
In Baron-Cohen’s (1995, p. 51) mind reading system, the ID, EDD, and SAM, come 
together to form the ability to infer “the full range of mental states” in the ToMM. At this final 
stage, the development of the ToMM is marked by the ability to engage in pretense, as it enables 
propositional thought, by using referentially opaque M-representations. The ToMM is borrowed 
from Leslie’s (1994b) use of the term, as Baron-Cohen (1995, p. 51) goes along with “much 
about what Leslie says about the working of the ToMM.”  These two accounts, therefore, appear 
rather similar and this convergence can be viewed as a strength—these theories are functionally 
equivalent.   
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Leslie and Baron-Cohen Compared 
Leslie (1994a, 1994b) and Baron-Cohen (1995, 1999) share the idea that ToM is an: 
evolutionarily ancient, thoroughly computational, domain specific, impaired in the case of 
autism, largely or wholly unaffected by language, early developmental unfolding of an innate 
capacity and that a specialized representational vehicle, known as the M-representation, provides 
the required structure to support the kind of content bearing propositional thought that allows 
one’s ToM to learn culturally, acquiring explicit folk psychological theories. That both Leslie’s 
(1994a, 1994b) and Baron-Cohen’s (1995, 1999)’s accounts of ToM should be so similar is to be 
expected; both researchers are drawing on the same array of developmental studies in outlining 
their models and variables such as intentionality, action, desires, and beliefs, which are stock-in-
trade for describing any account of mindreading (Apperly, 2011, 2012; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 
2006; Schaafsma et al., 2015). To use a cooking analogy, the differences between Leslie and 
Baron-Cohen’s versions of ToM appear not as different “cake recipes,” but as “different ways of 
cutting the same cake.”  
 
Variation in “Modules” and the Function of “Executive Functioning”  
When discussing possible cultural variation in ToM (see Chapter V), the notion of 
modularity is important to consider. CSR explicitly (Boyer, 2001, 2003; McCauley, 2011; 
Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999, 2004) and implicitly (J. L. Barrett, 2012; Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; 
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Bulbulia, 2005) refers to cognitive modules in explaining 
supernatural beliefs, but seldom discuss their actual characteristics or parameters.   
Leslie (1994b) emphasizes innateness and modularity to a greater extent than Baron-
Cohen does (1995, pp. 56-58; but, see also Baron-Cohen, 1998). Baron-Cohen eschews the label 
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of  “modularity,” as he largely rejects Fodor’s (1983) restrictive and ridged structural 
characterization of modules, whereas Leslie is more willing to embrace them.4 Although there 
are many misconceptions about modularity, one key misunderstanding is that modules all exhibit 
a strong form of informational encapsulation; the idea that some perceptual and cognitive 
information is impervious to cultural alteration. Fodor draws upon the apparent culturally 
invariant effects of the Müller Lyer illusion on the human visual system to prove the point. He 
argues that, despite having the information (knowledge) that the segment between the two arrow 
lengths is identical, the perception of dissimilar lengths remains.  
 
 
Figure 5 Müller Lyer illusion  
 
 
 
However, McCauley and Henrich (2006) reviewed the cross-cultural studies utilizing this 
illusion, finding that susceptibility to it varies depending on cultural input during key 
developmental windows. Thus, while a cognitive system may be modular, it can also display 
some level of flexibility and plasticity (H. C. Barrett, 2012; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).  
                                                 
4 For extensive discussions on the various ways to characterize modularity, see (Baron-Cohen, 1999; H. C. Barrett, 
2012, 2015; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Buller & Hardcastle, 2000; Sperber, 1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 
2004).  
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Domain specific, adaptationist, modular accounts have been critiqued for relying solely 
on the evolutionary environment of adaptation to characterize the functioning of a particular 
mental system, for their alleged innateness, inflexibility, and inability to learn (Chiappe & 
MacDonald, 2005; J. W. Jones, 2016). There is much to agree with here, however these critiques 
may be more a caricature than a character of evolutionary psychology. Modular, adaptationist 
accounts, have been revised (re-conceptualized) well beyond the narrow sightedness enveloped 
in the early schematics of modularity critiqued above. For example, modules can function as 
(both) fast (Type 1) or slow (Type 2) processes (H. C. Barrett, 2012; Morgan, 2016), levels of 
informational encapsulation will also vary, and thus integration with other systems and modules, 
or “learning,” will exhibit heterogeneity. Still, the central feature of modularity is functional 
specification (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007).  
Cognitive systems without functional specification are non-practical in the same way a 
carpenter’s tool box would be useless if it only contained a single “general tool,” or array of 
vaguely specified generic tools (Cosmides & Tooby, 2002). Natural selection drives adaptive 
specialization towards increasing functionality in the face of utter disarray (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994; Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2003). The characteristics of these adaptations can be quite 
diverse and may function in evolutionary novel situations and environments, but they still serve 
to filter out some information within the possible space of all decisions that could in fact be 
made.   
 Executive functioning (or the supervisory attentional system) is often described in the 
literature as a general ability comprising of working memory and the selection/inhibition of 
response in achieving some goal (Morasch, Raj, & Bell, 2013). There is also a robust discussion 
as to whether executive functioning is unitary in nature or consists of some procedural 
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specialization (Ardila, 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; Morasch et 
al., 2013). Yet even these proposals leave undefined any ultimate function, what are/were 
executive capabilities for?  
Evolutionary psychologists agree that the brain handles information in ways described by 
the wealth of excellent research on executive functioning capabilities, such as shifting, updating, 
or inhibition. However, they do disagree that these mechanisms exist without any functional 
specification, without any domain. Laboratory paradigms used to measure executive function 
typically focus on abstract tasks (e.g., Tower of Hanoi), which are content free, however, when 
“social situations and biological drives are involved, the ability to rationally solve problems 
seems to decrease in a significant way” (Ardila, 2008, p. 97). For example, when the Wason 
selection task, originally involving an arbitrary reasoning process that individual’s ultimately 
proved altogether horrible at, is reframed so that the participant has to reason about whether or 
not a social rule is being violated, task performance increases substantially (Cosmides, 1989; 
Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002). When the task moves from a general one to become more 
specific, the functionality of the system can display more, not less intelligence.  
This is because natural selection has designed the brain not as an abstract, general, 
problem solver, but as a series of specialized computational devices (H. C. Barrett, 2015), that 
handle content in specific ways. The absence of discussion between executive function 
psychologists and evolutionary psychologists has, combined with the general suspicion of 
evolutionary psychology and self-disciplinary narrow sightedness present in almost every field, 
produced two strangers with overlapping interests that just need a proper introduction to hit it off 
right. Part of the misalignment pertains to the functional properties of the mind and where they 
are stored or what system they reside in. For example, executive function researchers commonly 
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cite tasks in which automatic activation of responses would be unwise (Chiappe & MacDonald, 
2005). However, this does not color all of the executive function literature, not all domains 
generate automatic responses, or are incapable of delivering more controlled or refined abilities 
(H. C. Barrett, 2015). Indeed, evolutionary psychologists do acknowledge a small helping of less 
specified mechanisms (H. C. Barrett, 2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Krill, Platek, Goetz, & 
Shackelford, 2007). 
Given the paucity of general, generic, environmental problems to overcome (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1994, 2002), combined with the recurring force of more or less specific problems, 
perhaps domain general skills, evolved within the array of modules within the social brain. 
Similar proposals have been put forth in ridding psychology of folk notions of “the self” 
(Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007), which rather than existing as a unitary sui generis, mystical, 
essence, is the clap trap propaganda of an array of specialized cognitive devices exchanging 
information within specific environmental contexts. Given the strong systematic feedback of 
selective pressures for adaptations in the social domain, the appearance of generality could have 
developed from this. Thus, domain generality may be a collection of slower processing features 
of special computational devices with actual domains much larger than the target domains.   
Even systems which are often considered domain general, such as executive functioning 
or the supervisory attention system, etc. are biased toward the social domain. For example, 
humans don’t apply their “attention” to the underside of a plant leaf such as the Acythosiphon 
pisum do (pace the exception of a biologist or two), but in principle they could if attention was 
some all-purpose, unspecified, general learning function. In other words, above all, human 
attention is focused towards communicating with other humans. Importantly, even though human 
cognition is geared towards sociality (Bandura, 2001; Korman, Voiklis, & Malle, 2015; Pinker, 
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2010), this does not prevent it from functioning elsewhere outside the social domain (H. C. 
Barrett, 2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) and it does not prevent the 
development of fine grained specialization within a particular domain of information, as 
evidenced by the very fact that biologists exist alongside a great many other specialists, from 
bakers and stock brokers, to sail boat riggers and plumbers. However, as any comparative 
biologist can attest to, they must be vigilant against constant anthropomorphization of their 
research. Even science can be constrained by folk cognition (Shtulman, 2015) and even scientists 
display tendencies to perceive intention where there is none (Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 
2013). This marks the pervasiveness of the social brains influence on all cognition.   
The human “attentional” system is biased through and through towards a specialization in 
the social cognitive domain. This is because, on average, when any one of our “attentional 
systems” is triggered or applied, either by movement (Heider & Simmel, 1944), hearing a bump 
in the night (J. L. Barrett, 2004), seeing faces in the clouds (Guthrie, 1995), ultimate meaning in 
serendipitous events (Bering, 2002, 2003, 2011) etc., its default is the social realm of intentional 
agents with internal states such as beliefs and desires, when and where attentional facilities are 
employed in human cognition, we look for a mind first and ask questions later. When discussing 
the function of executive functions, supervisory attention systems, or some other “general” 
supervisory system, these mechanisms are likely part and parcel of social cognition modules.  
H.C. Barrett (2012, 2015) has argued that the empirical signature of human brain 
adaptations (i.e., modules) may turn out to be quite different from what psychologists currently 
believe. This is because we should expect that an evolutionary descent with modification 
approach to brain functional organization will have produced modular adaptations exhibiting 
heterogeneity in their functional characteristics. Thus, the distinction between domain general 
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and domain specific could therefore be far fuzzier than anyone has predicted. Regardless, Baron-
Cohen (1995, 1999, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005) and Leslie’s (1987, 1994a, 1994b, 
2000; Leslie et al., 2004) models of ToM give us some of the central neurocognitive modules of 
the social brain (Adolphs, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi, 2016; Crespi & 
Badcock, 2008; Dunbar, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2010; Gamble, 2013).  
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
MEASURING THEORY OF MIND AND ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTS 
 
 
Different aspects of ToM are commonly measured using tests that probe an individual’s 
ability to understand false beliefs, detect mental states and provide an appropriate response, 
detect sarcasm or white lies. There are also individual differences in ToM ability, which, if 
careful attention is paid, can be detected in day-to-day conversations with others, particularly 
individuals with the Autism/Asperger’s spectrum continuum (ASC). A perturbation in normal 
ToM processes has been primarily implicated in explanation of ASC individuals varying levels 
of trouble understanding intentionality and meta-representational ability (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 
2009; Leslie, 1987, 1994a). Below, several measures of traits associated with ASC are discussed, 
which are often operationalized to refer to various components of social cognition. Some of these 
measures—the Broader Autism Phenotype Questionnaire, Reading the Mind in the Eyes, and 
Rosset’s (Rosset, 2008) intentionality task—I utilize in this study.   
 
Measuring the Mental 
The most commonly used measure of ToM is the false belief task. This test is primarily 
utilized by developmental psychologists. It measures the point at which an individual (typically a 
young child) has adequate enough conceptual understanding of BELIEF to know that others can 
hold beliefs that differ from their own (Apperly, 2012; Gopnik, 1993). More formally, this is 
known as perspective taking. In a paradigm example of the task an object is placed in one of two 
opaque containers by the experimenter, and in full view of the participant and a second 
“confederate.” The knowledge that the object is located in one container (but not the other) is 
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shared by all three individuals. However, the confederate leaves the room and the experimenter 
then switches the location of the object to the other container. The experimenter then asks the 
participant where the confederate would look for the object when they return to the room. If the 
participant indicates that the confederate would look in the original location, despite their 
personal knowledge that this is not where the object really is, then they understand that others 
can hold beliefs that are different than their own. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Example of a false belief test. Adapted from (Frith, 2003, p. 83)  
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 These types of tasks are construed as tapping into the “first-order” of ToM, the mind-
reality distinction (Gopnik, 1993; Reddish, Tok, & Kundt, 2016). However, passing this type of 
false belief task only indicates that the BELIEF concept has been acquired. Not why it has been 
acquired (Apperly, 2012; Hutto, 2008). Additionally, around 20% of individuals with high 
functioning autism (HFA) are still able to pass these tasks (Francesca  Happé, 1994; Hutto, 
2008). In recent years, false belief tasks not requiring language ability have been developed and 
utilized in pre-verbal’s based on looking times and facial reactions (e.g., Buttelmann, Over, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Although interpretation of these 
preverbal paradigms is conflicting (c.f., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Heyes, 2014; Hutto, 2015); 
for a full review, see the 2012 special issue of the British Journal of Developmental Psychology 
on “Implicit and explicit theory of mind” (Low & Perner, 2012), there appears to be a 
substantive qualitative shift in whatever ToM abilities exist once language is acquired (Hutto, 
2008). Nevertheless, once the concept of belief has been acquired these tests are of little use in 
measuring individual differences in the ToM abilities of neurotypicals over the age of 8.  
That individual differences exist in ToM is apparent to anyone who engages in casual 
day-to-day conversations (Apperly, 2012). Simply, it can be more or less hard to understand 
what other people are thinking. These differences, however, extend beyond the more 
fundamental distinction of the first order belief task. Individuals are now capable of having 
beliefs about beliefs, also known as the ability to meta-represent (Sperber, 1994). Meta-
representation has also been structured as levels of intentionality (Dunbar, 2004), such that 
perspective taking can become increasingly complex (e.g., I think, that my advisor thinks, that 
the department head knows, that my advisor believes he forgot to zip up his fly). These situations 
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involve tracking intentions/beliefs and as in the example above, they can reach up to four or six 
levels (Dunbar, 2004; Gamble, 2013). 
 
 
Table 2 Levels of intentionality (gratuitously adapted from, Gamble, 2013, p. 23) (original in J. 
N. Cole, 2008) 
 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Ego is self-
aware 
Ego recognizes 
another person’s 
belief states as 
similar/different 
to theirs 
Ego wants 
another person 
to recognizes 
Ego’s own belief 
state 
Ego believes that 
the group 
understands that 
another person 
recognizes Ego’s 
own belief states 
My advisor 
believes he 
forgot to zip his 
fly 
My advisor 
believes that the 
department head 
thinks he forgot 
to zip his fly 
My advisor 
desires that the 
department head 
know he forgot 
to zip his fly 
My advisor 
knows that both 
he and the 
department head 
are aware that 
the department 
head thinks his 
fly is down 
 
 
Second order mind reading tasks, such as the “ice-cream man story” (c.f., Perner & Wimmer, 
1985; Reddish et al., 2016) require an individual to infer the beliefs of one person about the 
knowledge of another. Due to this complexity, these tests are more informative than first order 
tasks regarding individual differences in ToM. However, adolescent and adult neurotypicals—
and even some HFA (e.g.,Reddish et al., 2016)—still score at ceiling levels (Bowler, 1992). As 
individuals age it becomes harder to separate the intuitive and automatic aspects of mind reading 
from those that are at least minimally reflective using these tests. This is due to additional 
systems that support increasing social cognitive complexity, such as verbal intelligence quotient, 
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executive functioning, and working memory capacity (Apperly, 2011; Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009). 
 
Eye Gaze 
Another way second order ToM can be measured comes from tracking eye gaze. The 
eyes provide a cue toward the object(s)/event, or emotion an individual is tending to, allowing 
for the other(s) to share in this intentionality (Tomasello, 2014; Zuberbühler, 2008). Infants 
begin using gaze tracking, proper, between 9 to 10 months old (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007)  and 
higher gaze following scores predict having significantly more mental state words within the 
child’s verbal repertoire at 2 and a half years-of-age (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015). As young 
children gain proficiency tending to gaze direction and the eyes region in general, the eyes elicit 
automatic mental state inferences with maturity into adolescence (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) and adulthood (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001). The reading the mind in the eyes test (RMTE), developed by Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (2001), is a commonly used operational indicator of individual differences in the first 
stage of mentalizing, applying the correct mental state concept (e.g., ashamed, alarmed).  
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Figure 7 Example of the reading the mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, et al., 2001) 
 
 
The measure consists of 36 cross section pictures of the eye region, which represent a 
corresponding mental state. The participant selects the appropriate mental state from 3 other 
incorrect “foils” and a sum score is computed. Eye gaze activates the neurological architecture 
reliably implicated in ToM tasks (Crespi & Badcock, 2008), such as the superior temporal sulcus 
and the medial prefrontal cortex (Calder et al., 2002). Evidence for the stability of these findings 
exists developmentally (Moor et al., 2012; Overgaauw, van Duijvenvoorde, Moor, & Crone, 
2015) and cross-culturally (Adams et al., 2009). RMTE test has seen use in previous studies on 
religion (Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, & McNamara, 2011; Lindeman, Svedholm-
Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012).  
Other second order ToM tasks involve reading another’s mental state using auditory 
information. Toddlers understand that changes in voice pitch can indicate a change in mental 
state and goals (e.g., was that a happy scream or an angry one?) (Williamson, Brooks, & 
Meltzoff, 2015), as do adults (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; Rutherford, 
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Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002). Much less is known about the relationship between mental 
state attribution and auditory mind reading (Williamson et al., 2015) when compared to other 
lines of research in ToM. However, measures such as the “Reading the Mind in the Voice” 
(Golan et al., 2007) test, which asks individuals to pair verbal sentences with correct emotions, 
and experimental paradigms involving similar tasks (Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 
2011), consists in another way individual differences in mentalizing can be measured.    
Moving beyond second order intentionality, some tests tapping into individual 
differences in mentalizing combine both visual information (particularly eye gaze) and auditory 
information. These are known as more “advanced” measures and involve the ability to 
understand subtle social concepts such as sarcasm, conflicting emotions, white lies, and 
misunderstandings, and to keep track of, for example, what John thinks Susan thinks about him. 
The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) contains a carefully 
scripted movie where individuals are asked to follow the unfolding story line (friends coming 
over for dinner). The advantage with this task, as opposed to the previous tests based only on 
reading a story, is that the individual is able to draw on perceptual faculties that would normally 
be used in any day-to-day situation. They can track information from eye gaze, for example, 
facial expression, tone of voice, or even bodily actions in a single paradigm when inferring the 
mental states of the actors. Golan’s (2006) “Reading the Mind in Films” task follows a similar 
structure, however contains clips from movies that require inferring mental states, as opposed to 
a more fluid, diachronically unfolding, story line, such as the Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition. While these movie-based tests appear to be a more ecologically valid way to capture 
the full range of processes involved in the domain of ToM, they have not been used in the social 
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scientific study of religion to date. The reasons for this are somewhat unclear, however they may 
be seen as requiring more set-up effort on the part of the experimenter in certain situations.  
Other, more commonly used “advanced” tests of mentalizing, do not integrate audio and 
visual elements in real time. However, they still capture important nuances in mind reading. For 
example, Happe’s (1994) “Strange Stories” test presents short vignettes of social situations 
where individuals are probed for their appreciation of social cognitive concepts similar to the 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. Other tests, such as the Faux Pas Recognition 
Test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998), follow a similar conceptual domain of vignettes, 
and probe for the individual’s ability to detect inappropriate comments, intentions, beliefs, and 
show empathy.  
The most widely utilized individual difference measure of mentalizing is the empathizing 
quotient (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2009; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001). Empathizing is a construct tapping into an individual’s “drive to identify another person’s 
emotions and thoughts and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen, 
2002, p. 248). It pertains more to an understanding of mental state attribution, as measured by an 
appropriate, perspective taking response, than to applying the appropriate mental state, per se. 
However, the former is largely necessary for the latter to be conducted adequately (Baron-
Cohen, 2009). In its various forms, the empathizing quotient ranges from 15 items (Muncer & 
Ling, 2006), 25 items (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Goldenfeld, et al., 2006), to 
60 items (with 20 foils) in its full version (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & 
Wheelwright, 2003). It has the participant respond to questions such as “I tend to get emotionally 
involved with a friend’s problems” (Ibid, p. 373). The empathizing quotient has been used 
widely in research on religion (e.g., Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016; 
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Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015; Norenzayan et al., 2012; Rosenkranz & Charlton, 
2013; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).   
 
Broader Autism Phenotype 
Cognitive psychologists interested in the functional organization of the human mind often 
utilize populations of individuals with deficits in the domain of interest (c.f., Caldwell-Harris, 
2012). Individuals with ASC are the key population of interest for researchers interested in ToM 
(Crespi & Badcock, 2008; McCauley, 2011) as mentalizing ability is one of the central deficits 
underlying ASC (Baron-Cohen, 2009). All of the previous measures discussed are characterized 
by their ability to separate ASC individuals from neurotypicals (NT). ASC traits have been 
detected at subclinical levels, as present in the wider population, typically in relatives of ASC 
individuals. This is known as the broader autism phenotype (BAP) (Losh & Piven, 2007). Aside 
from low sociality (characteristic of mentalizing deficits), the BAP also consists of pragmatic 
language deficits and rigidity (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, & 
Piven, 2007).    
Often paired with the empathizing quotient in studies on religion, the autism quotient 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001) was the first scale designed to specifically 
measure the traits associated with the BAP. The full version consists of 50 questions, short 
version only 10 (Allison, Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2012), with 5 subscales covering “attention 
to detail, attention switching, communication, imagination, and social” aspects of the BAP. 
However, the communication, imagination, and social subscales theoretically overlap with one 
another in what I would best describe as ToM-social cognition domain related based on my 
discussion of ToM up to this point.  And while the autism quotient has 5 subscales, its use in 
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studies on religious belief have only ever reported the overall sum score to date (e.g., Banerjee & 
Bloom, 2014; Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, et al., 2011; Norenzayan et al., 2012). Whether or not 
the autism quotient has an appropriate factor structure for research on religious belief remains an 
open question.   
A recent attempt at capturing BAP characteristics by Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, and 
Piven (2007) has resulted in the construction of the BAP Questionnaire (BAPQ). It has three 
subscales: Aloof personality, rigid personality, and pragmatic language. The content of these 
three subscales appear to match up fairly well with the autism quotient subscales, however 
questions regarding imagination are absent from the BAPQ. Of particular interest, the “Aloof 
personality” subscale operationalizes the social deficit aspect of ASC, which Hurley et al. (2007, 
p. 1681) define as “lack of interest in or enjoyment of social interaction.” However, the BAPQ 
has proven psychometrically superior to the autism quotient (Ingersoll, Hopwood, Wainer, & 
Brent Donnellan, 2011). The Aloof invites participants to rate on a six point Likert scale (1, Vary 
rarely—Very often, 6) how much each of 12 statements applies to themselves. The content of the 
statements range from how much the individual enjoys social interaction (e.g., “I like being 
around other people”), to how much the individual feels they are connecting in social 
engagements (e.g., I feel like I am really connecting with other people”) (Hurley et al., 2007). 
Although scores on the Aloof (and the autism quotient) should correlate highly with measures 
such as Baron-Cohen’s empathizing quotient, due to the relationship between mentalizing ability 
and social interaction, the Aloof is not a measure of mentalizing. Nonetheless, it necessarily 
captures the downstream effects of lower mentalizing without suggesting that each and every 
low Aloof score is sufficiently explained via lower mentalizing. In other words, lower desire for 
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social engagement can stem from a variety of domains, only one of which may be variations in 
ToM. The BAPQ has not yet been utilized in a study regarding religious belief.  
Other methods available tapping into higher level aspects of ToM concern narrative 
evaluation coding for intentionality, teleology, use of emotion and mental state words (Bamberg 
& Damrad-Frye, 1991), negative propositions (Losh & Capps, 2003), and causal connecting 
phrases (Chakrabarti et al., 2009).   
All of the measures discussed here have two key points in common, their relationships to, 
and predictions for ASC and NT’s, as well as ToM in these two groups.  
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CHAPTER V. 
 
THEORY OF MIND: CONVERGENCE AND VARIATION 
 
 
Variation and convergence in any complex socio-cognitive trait or ability is, at some 
level, a to-be expected outcome of multiple factors. In this chapter, I provide a near exhaustive 
review of sources of possible variation in ToM. I do this in order to suggest, that, with as many 
possible ways as ToM can vary—having absolutely nothing to do with ASC—that ASC should 
only be seen as a peripheral concern in the relationship between mentalizing, ToM, social 
cognition, etc., and supernatural belief. I first discuss sources of this variation within the social 
brain, then, I draw attention to occurrences of convergence and apply the relevance of that 
literature to briefly touch on the theoretical strength of Leslie’s (1994b) ToM and the role of the 
SP in developing variation. Next, I introduce the “social brain” and “social disorders,” briefly 
discussing the case of schizophrenia and providing a more in-depth look at ASC and the BAP. 
This research directly relates to the measures utilized in the current study. Finally, I discuss a 
promising proposal from evolutionary psychiatry suggesting variation in ToM functioning is 
“normal” (also characterized by psychoses individuals), existing as a continuum of the “social 
brain.”  
 
Cross-Cultural Convergence and Variation in Theory of Mind 
Influences on variation in ToM development come from multiple sources, both 
environmental as well as biological. Multiple brain regions are implicated in different aspects of 
mindreading, however there is evidence of “core regions” (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; 
Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015; Rice & Redcay, 2015).  
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 False belief tasks tap into an important milestone in ToM development, the ability to 
deploy belief-desire concepts, ToM consists of much more than the ability to pass a false belief 
task (Apperly, 2012; Boyer & Barrett, 2005). Nonetheless, studies using the false belief task 
have shown remarkable convergence on the developmental trajectory of this conceptual change 
across and within cultures (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Despite the overall evidence of 
false belief understanding, for example among Chinese and Americans (Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & 
Sabbagh, 2008, p. 529), the course of development for theory of mind necessarily includes 
“specific experiential factors” that may affect the time table and order of developing specific 
concepts.  
For example, during narrative exchanges with their children, Chinese mothers tend to 
emphasize behavior whereas American mothers emphasize thoughts and emotions (Doan & 
Wang, 2010). This suggestion is telling in light of recent studies extending and combining false 
belief paradigms with more nuanced measures of conceptual emphasis in order to probe for 
variation between cultures. Children from so-called “individualistic” societies, for example, such 
as Turkey (Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015) & the United States (Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 
2006), and Australia (Shahaeian, Nielsen, Peterson, & Slaughter, 2014; Shahaeian, Peterson, 
Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011) tend to develop an understanding of diversity of beliefs first (i.e., 
that people can believe different things about the same situation). Children from so-called 
“collectivistic” societies, however, such as Iran (Shahaeian et al., 2014; Shahaeian et al., 2011), 
China (Wellman et al., 2006), and possibly Pakistan (Nawaz, Hanif, & Lewis, 2015), tend to 
develop understandings of knowledge access prima facie (i.e., that something could be true, but 
that others might not know this). However, one study, by O’Reilly and Peterson (2014) 
contrasting Aboriginal Australians (presumably collectivist) with Anglo-Australians (presumably 
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individualistic), found both groups to be similar in diverse belief emphasis. Thus, in light of 
O’Reilly and Peterson (2014) and Doan and Wang’s (2010) study, variations in the development 
of conceptual emphasis may have more to do with parenting styles than an individualist vs. 
collectivist divide, although more research is needed.  
Despite the convergence, there is evidence for cultural variation in passing false belief 
tasks. In a study with Samoan children, from within a culture discouraging discussions of mental 
states, Mayer and Trauble, (2013) found false belief performance improves only gradually, with 
the majority succeeding after the age of 8years old (Callaghan et al., 2005). Mayer and Trauble 
(2015) found Samoan children failed the false belief task and did not perform above chance on a 
true belief task in comparison to German children. Ahn and Miller (2012) found that Korean 
children out performed US children across 3 false belief tests, and variations in “self-concept” 
were also identified. In a study indicating variation within Western culture, British children 
outperformed their matched Italian counterparts on 1st and 2nd order false belief tasks, although 
their performance understanding mixed emotions was similar (Lecce & Hughes, 2010). 
Additionally, Naito and Koyama (2006) identified a developmental lag in the ability for Japanese 
children to pass the false belief task based on comparisons with western children. Since ToM is a 
learning mechanism, these differences, likely reflect expected developmental variation in false 
belief understanding trajectories rather than any ground breaking evidence that the core 
processes involved in ToM is substantively culture dependent. All “cultures” produce children 
capable of detecting agency and reading minds.  
Convergence on core aspects of ToM measured by developmental milestones, such as 
passing a false belief task, are unsurprising if ToM has at least a minimally innate basis (Baron-
Cohen, 1998, 1999; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 2001). Some features should reliably converge 
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around core aspects of cognitive architecture regardless of culture (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999, 
2004). As executive function capacity matures, ToM will inevitably be able to process 
increasingly complex representations (Carruthers, 2016; Leslie, 2000). While the intuitions to 
deploy the mind reading process are universal, these intuitions can be framed in a myriad of 
ways by higher level, reflective processes (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Coleman & Hood, 2015). 
Since ToM is the core mechanism enabling learning about beliefs and desires, which eventually 
form customs and traditions, the adult ToM entails a great deal of cultural “filling-in” (Apperly, 
2013; Heyes & Frith, 2014). For example, if you travel to Central or South America and are 
unaware of the customary “cheek kissing” greeting, depending on the context, you may end up 
thinking some strange thoughts.  
It is still unclear what is accounting for some of these cross-cultural differences. Overall, 
the research in this area is likely to be affected by many unobserved variables, which may have 
less to do with “culture” and more to do with sampling and measurement. For example, many 
cross-cultural studies fail to take into account that false belief test performance can vary with 
family size and bilingualism (Slaughter & Perez‐Zapata, 2014). Nonetheless, cultural “filling-in” 
does occur, typically at the direction of learning algorithms embedded within a particular module 
(H. C. Barrett, 2015; Boyer, 2010), or by changing the in-put information for a mechanism, as 
“what goes through our minds changes our minds” (Morin, 2016, p. 456). For example, an 
American four-year-old who views her parents praying each night may be enculturated into the 
idea that the mind is porous and can be influenced by the stray thoughts of other people (c.f., 
Luhrmann, 2011b); A child from Thailand is likely to develop the idea that minds can “wander” 
(c.f., Cassaniti & Luhrmann, 2011) upon hearing his parents discuss that their neighbor’s 
maladjusted mind may be controlling another individual in the community. Research supporting 
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this enculturation account has been recently published suggesting that a child’s religious 
background influences attributing awareness to God (Lane, Evans, Brink, & Wellman, 2016). 
The processes behind cultural learning come online at roughly the same time (Legare & Nielsen, 
2015) as the selection processor begins to function as a mechanism of selective attention (Leslie, 
2000). This allows for variation in ToM.  
  
Environmental influences on the Development of Theory of Mind 
Hughes, Jaffee, Happe, Taylor, Caspi, and Moffitt’s (2005, p. 356) twin study sample of 
1,116 sixty-month-old twin pairs in England, who were administered a wide range of ToM tasks, 
found that “environmental factors explained the majority of the variance in ToM performance. 
Theory of mind competency can be boosted a number of ways. Across five experiments, Kidd 
and Castano (2013) demonstrated that reading literary fiction temporarily improves affective 
ToM. Additional research suggests reading metaphor (Bowes & Katz, 2015), playing video 
games with virtual narratives (Bormann & Greitemeyer, 2015) and fictional TV dramas also 
produce similar enhancements. Controlling for age, gender, vocabulary, and parental income, 
Mar, Tackett, and Moore (2010) found that engagement with storybooks and children’s movies 
predicts ToM development. Educational research with preschool children makes clear the 
importance of storytelling and sharing for the development of ToM (Curenton, 2011; Fernández, 
2013) and has begun to identify ways teachers can increase aspects of ToM in the classroom 
(Ziv, Smadja, & Aram, 2015); for a review of studies indicating that Training ToM and 
executive function through school related tasks can boost performance, see (Kloo & Perner, 
2008). The use of mentalistic words in caregiver-child dyads (and quality of interaction; c.f., 
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Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007) is not only correlated with ToM development 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982), but can predict its developmental stage (Doan & Wang, 2010).  
A common denominator in these studies is the use of mental state words embedded in a 
narrative. Depending on the extent to which the linguistic practices within a given culture utilize 
mentalistic terms (belief-desire words) in their vocabulary, this may influence an individual’s 
understanding of other minds (for a review, see Lillard, 1998; Vinden, 1999). 
Variations in ToM have also been identified due to poverty and lifestyle conditions. In 
assessing trauma experienced in childhood with a sample of over 5000 adults, Germine, Dunn, 
McLaughlin, and Smoller (2015) found that exposure to adverse circumstances, such as abuse, 
was related to variations in ToM. Furthermore, there is evidence that emotion recognition in 
maltreated children is also impaired (Cicchetti, Rogosch, Maughan, Toth, & Bruce, 2003; 
Curenton, 2011; Moulson, Fox, Zeanah, & Nelson, 2009; Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 
2000) and in addition, the development of PTSD stemming from childhood abuse in females is 
linked with slower emotion recognition of complex mental states (Nazarov et al., 2014). Social 
and environmental factors, such as exposure to various hydrocarbons (e.g., tobacco smoke or 
neurotoxins) has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been shown to predict reduced cognitive development 
(Lovasi et al., 2014) and may contribute to variations in the social brain (Crespi, 2016; Nowack, 
Wittsiepe, Kasper-Sonnenberg, Wilhelm, & Schölmerich, 2015). Studies indicate that alterations 
in symbolic play, which is another hallmark of a developing ToM (Leslie, 1987), can occur in 
infants with prenatal substance abuse exposure when compared to their socio-economic matched 
counterparts (Beckwith et al., 1994) or even when compared to similarly matched preterm 
toddlers (Rodning, Beckwith, & Howard, 1989). Nonetheless, economic disadvantages may also 
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contribute to variation in ToM and social cognitive competencies (see, (for a review, see Heberle 
& Carter, 2015) for a review).  
Kuntoro, Saraswati, Peterson, and Slaughter (2013) found that lower economic status 
individuals in Indonesia lag behind both middle class Indonesians and Australians in knowledge 
access and emotion concealment. In another study finding a distinct socioeconomic advantage, 
Shatz, Diesendruck, Martinez-Bexk, and Akar (2003) also found that the linguistic markers for 
false belief in the Turkish and Spanish languages delivered an advantage when compared to 
English and Portuguese preschoolers. Cole and Mitchell (1998, p. 191) administered a false 
belief test and other measures of representational understanding to test for the ability to both 
appreciate deception and behave deceptively in young British children, finding socioeconomic 
status strongly linked to performance in understanding this representational capacity and a later 
study has yielded similar results (K. Cole & Mitchell, 2000). 
Over the course of two longitudinal studies with Australian children, one with a 
predominantly upper-class sample and another with a more socioeconomic diverse sample, 
McAlister and Peterson (2007; 2013) found having more siblings predicts better ToM ability 
across times 1 and 2, but speculate the socioeconomic status of their sample may have played a 
role (see also Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 
1998). Using more advanced tests of ToM involving actively reasoning about mental states in a 
sample of middle childhood aged children, Kennedy, Lagattuta, and Sayfan (2015) (however, no 
socioeconomic data was reported), and Wright and Mahfoud (2012), who also found a 
relationship based on number of friends, find further support for the number of siblings one has 
positively scaffolding ToM development and richness.  
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Conversely and on one hand, other studies, such as (Cutting & Dunn, 1999) find a strong 
relationship between socioeconomic status and false belief performance see also (Guiberson & 
Rodriguez, 2013), but fail to find any sibling effects. Whereas on the other hand, studies also 
find no relationship between passing false belief tasks and socioeconomic status only (K. Cole & 
Mitchell, 2000), or fail to find relationships between false belief tasks, socioeconomic status, and 
sibling effects (Shahaeian, 2015) (in Iranian children with 3 socioeconomic levels). A recent 
study with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and psychoses patients found a negative 
relationship between number of older siblings and ToM performance (Murray et al., 2015). This 
effect has been identified in ASC individuals even after controlling for age, verbal mental age, 
executive function, and severity of autism (O’Brien, Slaughter, & Peterson, 2011); but for 
contradicting results, see Matthews, Goldberg, and Lukowski (2013). From a biological 
perspective, motherly care is expensive and interaction time with each child decreases as the 
number of children in a particular family increases. Thus, both patterns may reflect the 
magnitude of maternal investment costs within a multi-child home associated with ASC and 
psychotic spectrum disorders, however (Crespi & Badcock, 2008).  
Overall, if, when, or precisely how, socioeconomic status may affect ToM development 
remains a muddled question. However, evidence is more clear that siblings do contribute 
positively to ToM in typically developing children by providing expertise in mental state 
discourse. The relationship between maltreatment in childhood and problematic variations in 
ToM is also robust, if not intuitive (i.e., if you verbally or physically abuse children this has 
psychological consequences). Engagement with other resources scaffolding ToM, such as 
narrative fiction, show temporary benefits, however more research is needed to confirm this and 
shed light on possible cumulative effects.  
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Day-to-Day Variations in Mindreading 
Social perception can be influenced by top down effects, based on context, person 
specific knowledge, and previous interactions (Malle, 2004; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In 
men, making a fist can influence how powerful individuals perceive themselves to be (i.e., 
internally directed ToM reflection) (Schubert & Koole, 2009). Social judgments and decision-
making can be influenced by haptic sensation (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010). Social 
exchanges involving money and the context of the exchange affect males and females’ responses 
on the RMTE (Ridinger & McBride, 2015). Not only do individuals show an in-group bias 
towards perceiving same culture facial features (Krumhuber, Swiderska, Tsankova, Kamble, & 
Kappas, 2015) and decoding mental states (Adams et al., 2009), but this preference is also 
demonstrated in situations involving political affiliation and perceived threat (Hackel, Looser, & 
Van Bavel, 2014). However, out-groups may also be ascribed mentality differently based on the 
motivations of the perceiver. Waytz and Young (2014) found that motivations driven by 
affiliation emphasize emotions and feelings in out-group mind attribution compared with 
effectance motivation, emphasizing agency, planning, and intentionality. Given mind attribution 
plays such a mediating role in intergroup relations (J. L. Barrett, 2011) it should also function in 
the domain on morality.  
Young and Waytz (2013, p. 93) have argued that the “primary” function of mind 
attribution and mental state reasoning is “for moral cognition and behavior” (see also Gray, 
Young, & Waytz, 2012). The eyes play a pivotal role in the ascription of mentality, eyes = minds 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995). Simply placing googily eye spots innocuously by a computer screen can 
increase prosociality (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005) and a poster 
featuring eyes, but not flowers, cuts lunchroom littering behavior by half in one study (Ernest-
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Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011). Compared to the nose, when the eyes are missing from pictures 
of faces, individuals find these faces as uncanny and soulless (Schein & Gray, 2015). By 
activating our ToM system eye spots contribute to day-to-day variations in moral cognition.  
 
Affiliation, Empathy, and Coordination 
Affiliation, empathy, and coordination lay at the heart of ToM (Seyfarth & Cheney, 
2013). Perceiving scenes of affiliation or isolation engage core neural regions of social cognition 
(Beadle, Yoon, & Gutchess, 2012). Anxiety is induced whenever strangers meet, however 
sharing in a brief cooperative experience (playing the video game Rock Band) amongst complete 
strangers’ increases empathy, trust, and affiliation (Martin et al., 2015). The motor performance 
coupling between two individuals engaged in a joint action task is greatly facilitated when 
preceded by a shared musical listening experience (Lang et al., 2015). Simple repetitive 
behavior, such as tapping, synchronizes between dyads based on their ability to predict the action 
of another (Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010).  For spectators of some “extreme” 
rituals such as firewalking, their heartbeat synchs up with those of the fire-walkers (Konvalinka 
et al., 2011), and even being a mere spectator to the event can be more emotionally exhausting 
than actually participating (Fischer & Xygalatas, 2014). Behavioral synchronicity is one avenue 
that can tune our minds with the minds of others (Baimel, Severson, Baron, & Birch, 2015).  
 
Clinical Variations in Theory of Mind 
The etiology behind possible variation in ToM is expansive. As one unique human trait is 
a hyper social brain (Gowlett, Gamble, & Dunbar, 2012), a normally working ToM mediates all 
of what we know to be our social lives. Disorders such as Autism and psychosis may represent 
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the extreme polar ends in a continuum of the social brain (Crespi & Badcock, 2008). ToM 
functioning is critically diminished in autism spectrum individuals (and unaffected siblings show 
slight decreases; (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2009; Frith, 2003), but appears amplified in cases of 
psychosis (Crespi & Badcock, 2008). However, from a clinical perspective variation in ToM can 
be affected by a number of mental health related concerns and disorders. These psychiatric 
disorders are the extreme ends along a continuum of typical ToM functioning.  
In typical healthy individuals, ToM ability decreases with normal aging (for a meta-
analytic review, see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). Both Alzheimer’s and dementia 
patients show impairments in emotion recognition (Henry et al., 2013; for a meta-analytic 
review, see Sandoz, Démonet, & Fossard, 2014). In other neurodegenerative disorders, such as 
Huntington’s disease, diminished ToM ability has been identified in clinically diagnosed, and to 
a lesser degree, preclinical cases (Adjeroud et al., 2016; for a meta-analysis, see Bora, 
Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015). Parkinson’s patients also show noticeable deficits in ToM 
(Bora et al., 2015; for a meta-analysis, see Péron et al., 2010). Specific impairments in ToM, 
separate from executive function, have been found in Fibromyalgia suffers (Di Tella et al., 
2015). Patients with multiple sclerosis demonstrate trouble with sarcasm and lie detection 
compared with controls (Genova, Cagna, Chiaravalloti, DeLuca, & Lengenfelder, 2016). 
Individuals with frontal and temporal lobe epilepsy, as well as children suffering from 
generalized seizures, have been identified with ToM impairments (for review and meta-analysis, 
see Stewart, Catroppa, & Lah, 2016). Additionally, ToM variations can be found in 
schizophrenia patients (for a review, see Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009), unaffected siblings (Ho 
et al., 2015) and relatives of schizophrenic patients (Mohnke et al., 2016), Borderline personality 
disorder (Vaskinn et al., 2015), psychopathy (Baez et al., 2015; Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2013), 
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depression (Cusi, Nazarov, MacQueen, & McKinnon, 2013; Zobel et al., 2010), comorbid (Hezel 
& McNally, 2014) and non-comorbid social anxiety disorder (Washburn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, & 
Harkness, 2016). Both bipolar disorder type I and II show impairments in mental state reasoning 
(but not mental state decoding), however this effect may be state dependent, being expressed 
only during active episodes of psychological impairment, and also depend on other cognitive 
functions and possibly psychotropic medication (Ioannidi, Konstantakopoulos, Sakkas, & Oulis, 
2015; Martino, Strejilevich, Fassi, Marengo, & Igoa, 2011). In one study, chronic somatoform 
pain sufferers demonstrated lower ToM ability (Zunhammer, Halski, Eichhammer, & Busch, 
2015), however similar to bipolar disorder, this may have been due to psychotropic medications 
as well. Individuals with dissociative identity disorder have trouble integrating the narrative self 
as stable and coherent across time (Seligman & Kirmayer, 2008). 
Many neuropsychiatric disorders suggest a links to increased inflammation. Recently 
researchers have been able to temporarily induce inflammation (Moieni, Irwin, Jevtic, Breen, & 
Eisenberger, 2015), finding it impairs emotion recognition on the RMTE task. Deficits have also 
been identified in children with specific language impairments and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (for meta-analyses, see Nilsson & de López, 2016; Uekermann et al., 2010) as well as 
preschool children with mild (Bellerose, Bernier, Beaudoin, Gravel, & Beauchamp, 2015) and 
severe traumatic brain injury (Ryan et al., 2015). Individuals with alcohol use disorder show 
impaired ToM (Bosco, Capozzi, Colle, Marostica, & Tirassa, 2014), and one study found half of 
recently detoxified alcohol dependent individuals showed impairments relative to controls 
(Maurage, de Timary, Tecco, Lechantre, & Samson, 2015). Emotion recognition is impaired in 
active methamphetamine abusers (Kim, Kwon, & Chang, 2011), methamphetamine abusers with 
6 months’ abstinence (Henry, Mazur, & Rendell, 2009), and polysubstance abusers in general 
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(Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, & Verdejo-García, 2011). Child sex offenders show slight 
ToM impairments when inferring the mental states of other adults when compared to controls 
(Elsegood & Duff, 2010; Ward, Keenan, & Hudson, 2000), however do not differ from controls 
when inferring the mental states of children (Elsegood & Duff, 2010).  
 
The Social Brain Continuum and Social “Disorders”  
 Psychiatric “disorders” do not represent unique, sui generis, puzzles to cognitive science 
informed by evolutionary theory. Risk alleles for these disorders would not be favored by 
evolution if they were solely maladaptive (Crespi, 2016). In providing the ultimate collection of 
adaptations for homo sapiens (Dunbar, 2009; Gamble, 2013) the social brain entails evolutionary 
tradeoffs. Autism spectrum and the psychotic spectrum represent two opposing end points on a 
continuum of the social brain (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi, 
2011a, 2016; Crespi & Badcock, 2008; Crespi & Go, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 8 Social brain continuum. Reproduced from (Crespi & Badcock, 2008, p. 257) 
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This is the “cost” of the social brain (i.e., evolutionary tradeoffs). Furthermore, from a biological 
perspective the social brain represents an expression of the genetic battle field for warfare 
between two opposing yet intermingling genomic imprints: Prototypically male and female traits. 
 The autism spectrum and psychotic spectrum are not underpinned by any single gene 
(Crespi, 2011a; Verhoeff, 2014). Any notion that there are genes directly for these etiologies is 
extremely misleading under this evolutionary model. Ultimately, however, there are genes for 
the social brain. Extreme dysregulation in this brain, as manifest in AS and PS disorders, anchor 
opposing ends of a social brain continuum. Genetic evidence supports this account, indicating 
that at four gene loci, genes deletions can predispose an individual towards one end of the 
continuum while duplications may predispose them to the other end (Crespi, Stead, & Elliot, 
2010).  
 
Psychotic-Spectrum 
 The “psychotic-spectrum” captures a whole suite of symptomologies associated with 
variation in the social brain. For example, hallucinations, delusions, self-rumination, and magical 
ideation are present in schizophrenia, depressive disorders, and bipolar disorder (Crespi & 
Badcock, 2008). These conditions predispose individuals to over detect agency and increase 
mind perception (Gervais, 2013b) such as hearing voices, thought insertion, or paranoia. The 
effect of different psychoses on ToM tasks can vary and is heavily debated. In schizophrenic 
disorders, ToM may either be impaired or amplified (for a review, see Brüne, 2005).  
The precise data on the gender distribution for schizophrenia is somewhat unclear, 
however, males have a “higher presence of negative and disorganized symptoms…” and females 
have a “higher prevalence of affective symptoms,” as well as faring better overall in severity 
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(Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad, & Kulkarni, 2012, p. 2). Interestingly, studies suggest that 
questionnaires used to measure the BAP closely resemble the negative social and disorganized 
dimensions of schizotypy (Crespi, 2011b). Testing for schizophrenia spectrum serum biomarkers 
has demonstrated effectiveness in differentiating between NT controls and schizophrenia roughly 
60-75% of the time. This is rather weak, but when differentiating schizophrenia from ASC, the 
prediction rate shoots up to 96% (Schwarz et al., 2012). Thus, there are characteristics of 
psychoses that partially overlap with the characteristics present in ASC.  
 
Autism-Spectrum   
Although variations in ToM can be found in a variety of clinical disorders, a deficit in 
ToM was identified as the defining characteristic for individuals diagnosed with autism in the 
1980’s (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Up until this point, the underlying 
mechanism(s) responsible for autism eluded developmental psychologists since Kanner (1943) 
first outlined its diagnostic criteria 73 years ago. Autism is not underpinned by any single gene 
or neurocognitive structure. Instead, it represents the combined influence of any system 
responsible for development of the human social brain (Crespi, 2011b, 2016). The diversity 
behind the symptomology of autism gave way to what is known as the “autism spectrum” (AS) 
(autism spectrum continuum, ASC) (Verhoeff, 2014). Individuals on the ASC can be typified by 
impairments “in understanding and coping with the social environment” (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985, p. 38) as well as a proclivity for narrow interests, repetitive behavior, and attention to 
detail (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2009; Frith, 2003, 2012). These two areas of variation (counting the 
latter description as a second cluster) differ dramatically depending on where on falls on the 
ASC and have wide ranging impacts on the day-to-day social life of ASC individuals.  
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 The main criteria for the low functioning autism (LFA) is a general deficit in intelligence. 
Typically, the intelligence quotient cutoff for this classification is below an 80. This negative 
variation in intelligence compounds and amplifies the potentially deleterious effects of an 
already diminished ToM. Towards the low end of the ASC, when an individual has trouble 
understanding intentionality, it may be hard to learn much of anything, as communicative acts 
that are meant for you (e.g. Sally this is how you tie your shoe laces) are unable to cognitively 
register as anything other than a random action in one’s environment (e.g. Sally hears speaking 
and sees someone moving). In this situation agency can be detected, but it does not cue up the 
“intentional stance,” to borrow from Dennett (1987). Thus Sally is unable to learn many of the 
life skills that would be acquired by individuals who are capable of deciphering the intentions 
behind a particular action, to varying degrees. Repetitive, stereotyped behavior, specific interests, 
and an aversion to interruptions in routine are also particularly exaggerated in LFA (Baron-
Cohen, 1995, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Crespi & Go, 2015; Hurley et al., 2007).  
The high functioning end of the ASC is characterized by average or above average 
intelligence, while retaining less extreme variations in ToM and mechanistic cognition etc. than 
are found in LFA (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012). Whereas an individual with LFA 
may be easily detected in a casual conversation by a neurotypical with little ASC knowledge, 
provided the LFA impairment is not so severe as to impeded any communication, the average 
person is unlikely to detect a HFA. Interestingly, such “narrow” interests and mechanistic 
cognition may actually contribute to an everyday advantage for HFA operating in contexts where 
attention to detail and analytic thinking are of importance (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Collectively, 
these behaviors are termed “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris & Jordan, 
2014).  
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Autism is four times more likely to affect males than females.  When autism does occur 
in females, its expression is typically more severe (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi & 
Badcock, 2008). Similarly, Asperger’s Syndrome, which maintains an etiology identical to HFA 
(but without the delayed linguistic development) is nine times more likely to occur in males than 
females (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005). Characteristics of the autism spectrum, such as 
deficits in mentalizing and social communication combined with the strengths of systemizing 
and attention to detail (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2010) also appear to characterize BAP 
males in the general population (Hurley et al., 2007; Sasson et al., 2013). For example, females 
consistently outperform males when inferring mental states from the eye regions (for a meta-
analysis, see Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013) as well as consistently scoring 
higher than males on the empathizing quotient (Baron-Cohen, 2009). During infancy, males cry 
longer and more often than females (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In further support of the “maleness” of 
ASC, males and females with autism perform similarly on both of these measures (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2015).  
Adult males demonstrate greater emotional reactivity to pictures without humans while 
females show the opposite pattern (Althaus et al., 2014). On average, and at only 24 hours old, 
before cultural effects may show influence, male neonates orient their gaze more towards 
physical objects, whereas females tend to focus on faces and people (Connellan, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Batki, & Ahluwalia, 2000; Geary, 2010). As children, males are drawn more 
towards mechanical, construction, and wheeled toys, whereas females show more varied choice 
in toys (for a review, see Hines, 2011; Jadva, Hines, & Golombok, 2010). These differences are 
not purely the result of enculturation as these same sex differences in toy preferences are also 
found in young chimpanzees (Kahlenberg & Wrangham, 2010) and rhesus monkeys (Hassett, 
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Siebert, & Wallen, 2008). Rat, Meadow Vole, Rhesus monkey, and deer mice, males all show a 
spatial navigation advantage (c.f., C. M. Jones, Braithwaite, & Healy, 2003).  In humans, 
compared to females, it is well established that males show enhanced mental and spatial rotation 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Kaufman, 2007; Parsons et al., 2004). This likely reflects the 
recurring division and specialization of labor throughout hominid evolutionary history, with 
males5 primarily tracking and hunting prey across long distances and unfamiliar terrain 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2013); studies of hunter gatherers also confirm this division of labor 
(Whiten & Erdal, 2012). Tracking and hunting require fairly accurate navigational skills and 
attention to detail that is rapid, otherwise one risks losing the trail and dinner (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2013; Liebenberg, 2006). On tasks measuring performance in attending to detail, such as 
the embedded figures test, which requires one to locate a “hidden” shape embedded within a 
larger geometric shape (Francesca Happé, 2013) non-clinical populations with autistic traits 
(Russell-Smith, Maybery, Bayliss, & Sng, 2012), TD males (Baron-Cohen, 2002), and children 
and adults with autism (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Keehn et al., 2009; Schlooz & Hulstijn, 
2014) show an advantage. When this test was given to ASC and TD participants under an fMRI 
scan, females demonstrate more activity in the Posterior parietal cortex then males, and both 
males and females show more activity than the ASC group, suggesting basic perceptual visual 
processing is attenuated in ASC (Manjaly et al., 2007). Despite this attenuation, however, ASC 
groups still outperform TD’s and fMRI studies also suggest atypical activation of a number of 
brain regions when completing the executive function test for ASC, even in their non-clinical 
                                                 
5 Although not directly related to the present discussion, it is important to point out that there is a domain specific 
female advantage in spatial memory for the absolute location of plant foods. This likely reflects the recurring 
specialization of women as primarily foragers, tasked with remembering the specific locations of edibles for 
gathering (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). Gathering has proved important to human evolution (Buss, 2016), yet it is an 
under researched topic in hunter gatherer studies and due to the nature of, and materials required for, gathering, the 
archaeological evidence is quite literally not set in stone (Whiten & Erdal, 2012).  
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siblings (Spencer et al., 2012). Additionally, performance on the test in childhood has 
demonstrated the ability to predict the severity of repetitive behavior in adolescence (Eussen, 
Gool, Louwerse, Verhulst, & Greaves-Lord, 2016). Two-year-old children with ASC do not 
utilize biological motion cues (measured as a light point display) the way typically developing 
children do, instead utilizing cues from their physical contingencies (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, 
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009). Compared to the looking times for images of social interaction in 
toddlers ages 12 to 43 months old, looking at geometric patterns for more than 70% of the time 
almost guarantees a diagnosis of autism (Pierce, Conant, Hazin, Stoner, & Desmond, 2011). 
Males in general and both high functioning females and males on the ASC demonstrate superior 
ability in systemizing.  
 
Systemizing 
Systemizing is a cognitive style driven by preference for the identification and 
manipulation of rule based systems (Baron-Cohen, 2009). It involves detecting regularities and 
extracting behavioral rules in the form of “If I do x, then y happens” (Baron-Cohen, 2002). 
Quantifying and breaking wholes into various parts that can be manipulated and tested are key 
features of systemizing. Systemizing is a prototypical activity for males and male systemizers 
show positive correlations of activation in resting state activity between the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, while the opposite is true for females 
(Takeuchi et al., 2014). Almost like the ends of two magnets, the systemizer is attracted to 
systems. Baron-Cohen (2010) gives examples of some of the more prevalent types of systems; 
abstract systems (e.g., musical notation), social systems (e.g., business management hierarchy), 
mechanical systems (e.g., car engine), natural systems (e.g., weather patterns), numerical 
  61 
systems (e.g., calendar), and motoric systems (e.g., throwing a Frisbee). Thus systemizing is, 
ipso facto, folk physical ability. It is concerned with causality and interactions with objects 
displaying non-agentive movement (Paganini & Gaido, 2013). Systemizing is useful for 
repairing your old video cassette player or changing the breaks on your car, but much less so 
when trying to infer the intentions and desires of another person. For intuitive understandings of 
the mental state of others, empathizing works best.  
 
Empathizing  
Empathizing is a cognitive style encompassing much of the domain of social cognition, it 
involves “the attribution of mental states to others, and an appropriate affective response to the 
other’s affective state” (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p. 248). In contrast to systemizing, empathizing 
allows you to predict the behavior of other biological agents and “requires an imaginative leap in 
the dark” (Ibid), as inferences are made into the unseen mind, often in the absence of enough 
data. Females are more likely to be high empathizers than males (Baron-Cohen, 2009, 2010). 
Studies also suggest a female advantage on the ability to pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 
2002; Charman, Ruffman, & Clements, 2002). Taking into account the previous two sections, the 
female advantage for mental expertise is clear.  
 
Systemizing and Empathizing 
Males typically outnumber females in jobs or activities that entailing systemizing, such as 
the sciences (Baron-Cohen, 2002). This occurrence could be attributed to outright male 
dominance and control of resources, discouraging females from being motivated to engage in 
these activities. Interestingly, one cross-cultural study in four countries found that systemizing 
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explained 27% of the variance in motivation to learn science, while gender explained only 1.5% 
(Zeyer et al., 2013). Subsequent studies have strengthened the relationship between systemizing, 
male gender, and the specific interests found in the sciences (Byrd-Craven, Massey, Calvi, & 
Geary, 2015), however, others suggested that while the previous relationships hold, the 
empathizing and systemizing quotient may not affect performance in these disciplines 
(Morsanyi, Primi, Handley, Chiesi, & Galli, 2012). When differences in the empathizing and 
systemizing quotient are plotted between the sciences and the humanities, individuals within 
science, technology, engineering and math based fields score higher on systemizing, individuals 
within the humanities show stronger empathizing, and the expected sex differences can even be 
found within each field (Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Bor; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, Colden, 
& Gazzaniga, 2007).  
The differences in cognitive style assessed by the empathizing and systemizing quotient 
are candidates for universal aspects of human cognition (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006). The sex differences between men and women, as well as the ability 
to separate ASC from NT’s, has remained stable between Japan and Britain (Wakabayashi, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006). Females typically score higher on tests and tasks 
requiring empathizing, lower on tests and tasks requiring systemizing, whereas the inverse is true 
for males and ASC individuals (Auyeung, Allison, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2012; 
Auyeung et al., 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003).  
  
  63 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, THEORY OF MIND, AND VARIATION 
 
 
The development of ToM into adult years and within a given cultural context has been 
under studied and to the extent that (Apperly, 2013; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gelman & Legare, 
2011; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Heyes & Frith, 2014; Leslie, 2000; Vinden & Astington, 2000) 
ToM is “colored-in,” shaped via natural pedagogy (Taves, 2015), and other environmental 
factors through ontogenetic construction (Heyes, 2003) there should be cultural variation (H. C. 
Barrett, 2012; Robbins, 2008; Whiten, 2013). Furthermore, depending on the extent to which the 
linguistic practices within a given culture utilize mentalistic terms (belief-desire words) in their 
vocabulary, this may influence an individual’s understanding of other minds (for review, see 
Lillard, 1998; Vinden, 1999). The mind is understood by the formation of a folk psychological 
theory.  
Folk Psychology concerns how behavior is related to the mind. Using the belief-desire 
concepts introduced by ToMM-SP (see Chap III.), the mind constructs “theories,” linking these 
concepts to our experience (Morton, 2009).  These theories have the potential to shape the way 
events and situations are perceived and the appropriate behavior required in a specific context. 
This chapter discusses variations in folk psychology, which may influence how we view other 
minds and their relationship to the unseen—beliefs and supernatural agents.  
 
Cultural Variations in Folk Psychology 
Psychological–anthropological studies, focusing on “the way in which cultural content 
‘interfaces’ with psychological processes” (D'Andrade, 1981, p. 182) constitute a promising 
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avenue to explore cultural variations in how the mind is construed. Folk psychology, our 
everyday understanding of reasons for actions and their relationship to the mind (Hutto, 2008; 
Malle, 2004), provides the appropriate interface to explore how “the folk” conceptualize “the 
mind.” For example, as an individual living in the European-American world, explaining unusual 
behavior, such as if my thesis committee chair came to school with his head shaved bald, would 
likely entail appealing to a breakdown in his own mental faculties (e.g., He’s gone crazy!). 
Although alternatives could be offered, nothing else is needed to describe this occurrence. If this 
situation occurred somewhere in Thailand or Indonesia, however, the explanation may be that 
someone’s uncontrolled mental energy has entered my advisor’s brain and has caused him 
remove all of the hair from his head (e.g., He’s been possessed!). And while both of these 
explanations are related to ToM—in that they concern the socially acceptable constraints in 
which behavior is interpreted in light of a particular conception of the mind—neither case may 
be influencing some of the implicit, automatic processes recruited by ToM. These processes 
allow the creation of folk psychologies. For example, just because a given culture has a folk 
psychological theory denying the possibility of knowing what is in another’s mind does not mean 
that they do not think about the minds of others (Lillard, 1998; Luhrmann, 2011b). At the 
explicit level, ToM is ultimately a social enterprise, incorporating not just cognitive processes 
but also explanations of behavior, contextual meaning, and utilized for social control and 
management (H. C. Barrett, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2010; Byrne, 1996; Korman et al., 2015; 
Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007; Malle, 2004; Tomasello, 2014; Whiten & Erdal, 2012), 
Understanding variations in the folk psychology of the mind contributes to an understanding of 
ToM.  
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Folk psychology represents an important level of description for the more basic processes 
of ToM and for explanations in CSR (Taves, 2009). Luhrmann (2011a, p. 77) reviews the 
anthropological literature on hallucinations and sensory overrides, connecting them to 
supernatural belief and the functioning of the social brain continuum. Hearing voices or seeing 
things that might not be there qualifies as a non-ordinary experience. No individual would deny 
that people legitimately believe many non-ordinary experiences (or even ordinary) consist of 
episodes where they are communicating with a supernatural agent. No researcher would deny 
that ToM is involved when engaged in supernatural communication. However, the target or 
“proper” domain of ToM is other humans—not gods—but our folk psychological framework, as 
evidenced in the case of religion, spills over into the cultural or “actual” domain of this 
mechanism. The framing of these non-ordinary experiences is under grid by an individual’s 
biology (i.e., modular structure), it always involves a “cultural invitation” to a “specific theory” 
(p. 77). This is congruent with the social control and management function of folk psychology 
(Malle, 2004). Folk psychology opens humans up to what Galen (in prep) has characterized as 
“libel phenomenology.” In sum, there is a difference between having an experience and the 
description of that experience, whose characterization necessarily includes information gleaned 
from others, some of which will be false. The phenomenology of perception is important, but 
both of these descriptions/processes are inferential.  Is that awe inspiring and interconnected 
feeling you get walking in the woods “the work of God” or the equally beautiful byproduct of a 
strictly materialist worldview? Did Joseph Smith’s “seer stones” really allow him to receive 
direct revelations from God or was the founder of the Latter Day Saints simply a charismatic 
man who had interesting conversations with rocks? Due to the functioning of humans evolved 
coalitional psychology (Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 2015)—trust—everyday folk 
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psychological discourse opens us up to misdirection regardless of how sincere the misdirector 
may be (Sperber, 2010). Non-ordinary experiences can occur regardless of cultural background, 
but these are in turn shaped by how individuals conceptualize the mind. Luhrmann (2011a, 
2011b, 2012, 2013) emphasizes the role of learning in acquiring these capabilities. She notes that 
while all folk theories of the mind are acquired socially, it is usually only in spiritual contexts 
that one is urged foster the idea of a “porous mind.”  
 
Folk Psychology and Language  
One avenue for variation in folk psychology centers on language (Astington & Baird, 
2005). Acquiring language, with its appropriately structured syntax, can not only scaffold the 
implicit process involved in ToM (for review, see J. de Villiers, 2007; J. G. de Villiers & de 
Villiers, 2014; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003); see  for a review), but also directly delimits the 
range of given mental states terms (Lillard, 1998). Mental state terms are a human universal, all 
languages and all cultures have at least some. The English language has over 2,000 words 
denoting emotions, however the Chewong of Malaysia, in addition to possessing 5 terms for 
mental processes (translated as want, want very much, forget, know, and miss or remember), 
have roughly 23 terms for bodily states, traits, or emotions (Howell, 1981, 1984; Lillard, 1998). 
As Lillard (1998, p. 13 italics in original) directs us: (Note that “think” is not even among them.) 
The Junin Quechua of Peru, do not regularly appeal to or even have equivalent words for, the 
English and Spanish equivalents of “think,” and instead use “say” in its place (Adelaar, 1977; 
Vinden, 1996). In turn, this may limit the ability to pair mental states with corresponding actions, 
thus resulting in a developmental variation in ToM and folk psychological explanations, as 
mentalistic concepts are largely superfluous for the Quechua (Vinden, 1996). Another similar 
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form of cultural variation in explicit ToM comes from Papua New Guinea. In many Melanesian 
communities the ability to make inferences as to the mental contents of another is something 
viewed with great skepticism, as the mind is strongly considered to be opaque (Robbins, 2008). 
When minds are considered “unknowable,” motives may become less important (Lillard, 1998; 
Ochs, 1988). For example, Lillard (1998, p. 13) points out that “Children in Samoa do not try to 
get out of trouble by saying, ‘I did not do it on purpose,’ as they do in [European-American] 
culture; instead they deny having done the deed at all.”  
 
Folk Psychology and the Mind 
Lillard (1998) suggests that most European Americans have a very dualistic notion of the 
mind, first put forth by Descartes, which conceives of the mind as distinctly separate from the 
body, yet located within it. The mind, however, is what people typically speak of when referring 
to a notion of themselves (Johnson, 1990). Thus, to lose an arm in an industrial accident, for 
example, is not to lose a part of “the self” only a part of one’s body. The European American 
mind is also seen as a stable, unitary concept—after all, one typically says they have changed 
their mind, not their prefrontal cortex (Lillard, 1998). In contrast, the Japanese emphasis on mind 
is more fluid—it is integrated at various levels with the body. The Japanese term “kokoro,” 
translated as “the embodied mind” (Lebra, 1993, p. 63), is affect laden, located in the heart and 
includes links to genes and blood (Lebra, 1993; Lillard, 1998). Even the terms “hara, ki,” and 
especially “seishin,” which denote more spiritual conceptualizations of the mind, are associated 
with the body (Lebra, 1993). Naito and Koyama (2006, p. 299) found Japanese children tended 
to emphasize behavioral or rule based explanations in false belief understanding, only “scarcely” 
appealing to mental states. Not to syncretize or conflate Japanese and Chinese cultures, however, 
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but Naito and Koyama’s (2006) finding is buffered by Doan and Wang’s (2010, p. 1498) 
discovery that Chinese mothers emphasize “physical and behavioral manifestations of emotions” 
in narrative interactions with their children in comparison to their American counterparts, 
thereby temporarily emphasizing the body (behavior = body) over the mind. Despite these close 
associations with the body, Japanese minds are thought of more as relational entities than fixed 
structures, the mind(s) both are and are not a part of the body (Lebra, 1993). European 
American’s may change their mind, but their Japanese counterparts could be changing their hara, 
ki, kokoro, or seishin.   
As discussed above, different folk psychological conceptualizations of the mind may 
entail variations in attributions of and reasons for behavior. The most current and extensive 
exploration of this variation is summarized in Luhrmann (2011b, p. 5) and colleagues’ collection 
of “position papers” on the possibility of an “anthropological theory of mind.” That is, a ToM 
that is rooted in universal psychological processes, yet pays mind to cultural variation. A brief 
summary of these six positions will help elucidate the cultural variance of how individuals 
conceive of the mind:  
The Euro-American modern secular ToM treats the mind as having a clear boundary 
between itself and objects in the external world. Thus, under this model of the mind, any notion 
that a thought could be “inserted” or wander into another’s brain, is more likely to be treated as a 
case of schizophrenia than a message from the planet Xenu. The modern secular ToM is the 
proprietary, basic programming for the theories of mind that follow.   
The Euro-American modern supernaturalist ToM (Luhrmann, 2011b), largely emulates 
its secular brother. However, it treats the mind as something selectively permeable, allowing for 
mental penetration for special classes of entities, such as gods, spirits, or “mental-like energy” 
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involved in new age healing practices. Through training and practice, the supernaturalist ToM is 
open to developing expertise in communicating with unseen agency.  
 The opacity of mind theory (Luhrmann, 2011b) conceives of the mind as inherently 
unknowable to other individuals. Most often found throughout the South Pacific and Melanesia, 
variants of the opaque mind privilege intentions that are expressed in explicit communication 
over all else. It is considered bad manners to look in another’s eyes, as this might indicate one is 
thinking about the unexpressed mental contents of the other. While allegedly impervious to other 
humans, the opaque mind is nonetheless permeable by a special class of agents—spirits.  
 In the transparency of language theory, the best examples of which stem from Central 
America (Luhrmann, 2011b), language is (should be) a reflection of entities and relationship that 
hold in the world—not internal mental states. In some cases, fiction and pretense by children is 
discouraged. Mental state vocabulary words are few, as what matters most is the relationship 
between an utterance and facts in the world, not correspondence to an inner mental state.  
 Under the mind control theory, the best example being found in Thailand but also in other 
parts of Asia, discipline of the mind is emphasized (Luhrmann, 2011b). Minds can exhibit 
greater or lesser degrees of “control.” In a poorly controlled mind, one where emotions and 
thoughts may be overbearing, these mental states can infect other unbalanced minds and vice 
versa. This theory of mind differs noticeably from the secular mind, as “mind stuff” is able to 
enter the minds of others, still partially bearing the original thinkers mental state.  
 The final theory of mind Luhrmann (Luhrmann, 2011b) has identified, perspectivism, 
typical of some Amazonian peoples, suggests that minds can travel from one body to the next. 
Individuals may believe that they can take up the mental faculties of, say, a jaguar. Likewise, a 
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jaguar could contain a human mind and individuals have claimed to see just such instances. 
There is also the fear that one could end up permanently in some non-human form.  
Two themes emerge amongst these different cultural theories of mind; the distinction 
between a porous and a bounded mind (Luhrmann, 2011b, 2012). While no cognitive scientist 
would deny cultural variation of ToM, the extent to which a particular cultural expression has the 
ability to affect implicit, lower level, processing and representation of mental states is a key point 
of contention (Astuti & Bloch, 2012; Danziger, 2009). Thus, while different cultural theories of 
mind may enable an individual to believe their thoughts can inhabit and control the body of 
another individual (Cassaniti & Luhrmann, 2011) or that they are engaged in a conversation with 
the Christian god (Luhrmann, 2012; Luhrmann & Morgain, 2012), or that the secular mind is 
bounded—existing only in the head (Luhrmann, 2011b)—these are cultural expressions, the 
“theories” of an underlying cognitive architecture (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999, p. cxxvi). 
It is easy to see how the different folk theories of the mind characterized by Luhrmann 
(2011b) underlie, and indeed are, much of what we think of when conceptualizing religion. But, 
“religion” is hard to define outside of its Christian history and its status as a useful category must 
be proved and not assumed. Drawing on attribution theory, Taves (2009) has recently introduced 
the expression “things deemed religious or special” in order to create a tractable category for 
scientific inquiry, connecting first-hand accounts of folk psychological experience to the 
cognitive mechanisms that generated them. The next chapter reviews these mechanisms.  
  
  71 
 
CHAPTER. VII 
 
THEORY OF MIND AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION 
 
 
Why does human belief in some sort of supernatural agency appear, stretching far back 
into deep history, and, currently, across oceans and continents? If a family member or friend 
suffered from blindness, why, in order to return their vision, might someone choose to perform a 
ritual that has no actual causal connection to any possibility of reversing blindness, such as 
prayer (pace Jesus Christ himself; John: 9, King James Version), or concoct a potion of rust, 
dehydrated pig’s eye, and wild honey to inject into their loved one’s ear to rectify this malady 
(Legare & Souza, 2012)? Why do humans believe that there is a soul and that this immaterial 
“self” may venture into the afterlife upon death? These types of questions, along with many 
others commonly regarded as comprising “religion,” can be addressed by the cognitive science 
of religion.  
Rather than constantly engaging in debates over what religion “really is,” the strategy of 
fracturing religion into individual components, such as anthropomorphism (Guthrie, 1995), 
teleology (Kelemen, 2004), theory of mind (Boyer, 2001) etc., has been met with great success in 
CSR. The different theories of ToM used in CSR, or terms rather, all capture phenomena that can 
be categorized as either secular or religious. Take, for example, ritual drumming (or other 
musical engagement), which is a common component of religious gatherings. What separates a 
religious ritual from a nonreligious ritual? Is there something inherently special about banging on 
a container to produce a sound that makes this act particularly “religious?” Although religion and 
religious rituals do hold great personal meaning and special status to many individuals, there is 
nothing particularly special about them. McCauley and Lawson (2002, p. 10) exemplify the 
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relationship between a religious ritual and a nonreligious ritual by drawing attention to the 
particular action(s) and not the aura of cultural meaning the act is embedded in: “Ritual 
drummers ritually beating drums are still drummers beating drums.” The categories of religion 
and the secular are modern inventions of the nation state; they are co-constructive and depend on 
one another to gain their own meaning (Jong, 2015; McCutcheon, 2007). There is nothing 
special about religion (Bloch, 2008), it is a folk concept, a family resemblance category 
(Bulbulia, 2005).  
Nonetheless, CSR does find that there are still something’s that deserving of the label 
“religion.” Following McCauley (2011), I distinguish popular or folk religion from theological 
reflection. An example of popular religion would be the widespread belief in the evil eye; the 
idea that a curse or hex can be given to an individual through a malignant glare. This kind of folk 
belief—sending or receiving causally opaque mental energy—goes hand in hand with the idea of 
a “porous theory of mind.”  
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Figure 9 Examples of the “evil eye” talisman: from a market (upper left) by FocalPoint / CC BY-
SA 3.0; “mal de ojo” from El Salvador (middle left); Roman-era mosaic depicting evil 
eye (bottom left) United States Public Domain; A quote from the 13th century Islamic 
scholar Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī combined with a talisman (right)  
  
 
From West Asia to the Americas and stretching back into antiquity, people have created or 
purchased amulets and other artifacts to protect both themselves and their children from its 
malevolent powers. But this kind of religion exists and pervades through theological reflection as 
evident by the fact that believers in the evil eye are not just “pagan folk,” although many may be, 
they are Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc.—much to the chagrin of the theological reflection 
espoused by these ecclesial authorities. Still, “if humans were naïve realists there would be no 
religion” (Lieberoth, 2013, p. 169). And indeed, many times these folk beliefs are 
commandeered by theology and even absorbed into a particular religious’ tradition (Xygalatas, 
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Forthcoming). Shops selling “religious” artifacts side by side with various magical powders, 
potions, or other items can be found throughout the Americas (Chesnut, 2012). The natural roots 
of “religion” lay in cognitive mechanisms with a deep evolutionary history and do not 
necessarily align with their theological counterparts, although their cultural expression is 
continually elaborated on.  
Religion is not a sui generis phenomenon (Coleman & Hood, 2015; McCutcheon, 2007; 
Taves, 2009), it requires no unique or special postulates in order to be explained by science—
according to McCauley (2011, p. 155) “the sundry psychological dispositions that develop in 
human minds” are all that is needed (also see Lawson, 2000). Thus, no matter what the 
mechanism is called that mediates social interaction with gods and other spirits, this will be a 
mechanism that operates in a number of domains having absolutely nothing at all to do with 
religion. CSR is methodologically pluralistic, encompassing a variety of disciplines from 
religious studies, anthropology, and primarily, cognitive science. Religious ideas are natural 
byproducts of ordinary cognitive faculties and this makes them appealing, and easy to transmit 
(J. L. Barrett, 2011, 2012; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2001, 2003, 2010; McCauley, 
2011; Taves, 2015; Xygalatas, 2014). Despite the appearance of widespread surface variation in 
religious beliefs there are remarkable convergences across people, places, and time. As 
McCauley (2011, p. 152) puts it: 
A small number of variations on a limited set of elements lies beneath the assorted 
myths, rituals, beliefs, doctrines, icons, sacred spaces, and more that humanity’s 
religions present. Our maturationally natural cognitive systems are primarily 
responsible for those elements and the forms that their variations take. 
 
It is no coincidence, then, that religious representations often involve a violation of the kinds of 
features the ToM system has been “designed” to expect (e.g., That two solid objects can’t pass 
through each other) (see Chapter III.).  
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Religious ideas are about belief in supernatural agents (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Franek, 
2014). Theologians (Plantinga, 2011) and other religiously inclined appear to premise this much 
(e.g., J. W. Jones, 2016). Despite “religion” being a problematic and deeply contested category, 
reflecting euro-protestant ethnocentrism (Cotter & Robertson, 2016), supernatural agents do 
differ from ordinary agents (e.g., humans) by possessing non-ordinary powers (Taves, 2015), 
violating our intuitive assumptions about culturally available schemas (Purzycki & Willard, 
2015) and reoccurring core domains of knowledge (Boyer, 2001, 2003). This characterization 
may not capture the precise qualities possessed by each and every “religious representation,” 
pace J. W. Jones (2016), but one has to start somewhere and at some level of generalization. 
 
 
Table 3 Counter-intuitive agent concepts (Adapted from Boyer, 2003, p. 119) 
 
Person + counter-intuitive physics “Ghost entered room through the wall!!!” 
Person + counter-intuitive biology “Spirits never die!!!” 
Person + counter-intuitive psychology “This statue will listen to your prayers!!!” 
 
 
For example, despite the fact that trees lack ears and a brain, the Uduk-speaking people of Sudan 
believe that ebony trees hold strategic knowledge and can listen in on their conversations (Boyer, 
2001). In the monotheistic traditions quasi-incorporeal beings such as angels are not only thought 
to communicate socially with individuals, but they can pass right through your bedroom wall on 
their way to perform a miraculous feat. For many individuals, interacting with these incorporeal 
beings is a daily occurrence (Luhrmann, 2012). Studies suggest that thinking about these 
supernatural agents activates the same areas of the brain utilized in normal, everyday, social 
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cognition, when thinking about ordinary agents (Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & 
Cacioppo, 2009; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011; Kapogiannis et al., 2009; 
Kapogiannis, Deshpande, Krueger, Thornburg, & Grafman, 2014; Schjoedt, Stødkilde-
Jørgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009). ToM is a core system supporting religious thought.  
   
The Meta-Representational Mind and Supernatural Belief 
Meta-representations, to recall its earlier discussion in the manuscript, is a 
representational, cognitive copy, of some other primary representation (e.g., the difference 
between seeing a particular tobacco pipe and thinking about a tobacco pipe). Along with others 
(Bloch, 2008; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Gervais, 2013b; Lane & Harris, 2014; McCauley, 
2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), J. L. Barrett (2011, 2012) suggests the relationship between 
ToM and religious belief rests not on any single cognitive system per se, but in the capacity to 
have a meta-representational ToM (or something like it), instead. On his account, ToM of the 
highest order is the adaptation that makes religious belief possible. “The concurrence 
hypothesis,” which J. L. Barrett (2011, p. 212) puts forth, argues that whatever capacities exist 
that makes humans, human, also makes religion distinctively human. In order to have a 
relationship with an unseen god, just like having a relationship to the mind of another, one must 
be able to represent and reflect on the content of other’s thoughts. According to J.L. Barrett, 
meta-representational ToM covers several domains, from enabling cooperation and trust, to 
facilitating the transmission of cumulative culture. This is why archaeologists often emphasize 
the role this ability has played (much as it continues today) in socio-political control and 
dominance (Gamble, 2013; Lewis-Williams, 2002), which evolved hand-in-hand with religion. 
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Like Bering’s account below, J. L. Barrett finds other animals lack the symbolic capacities 
required for religious belief.  
Meta-representational Research  
 The human social cognitive system, effortlessly and intuitively, generates and responds to 
religious ideas, such as belief in supernatural agents in neurotypical individuals. Perceiving these 
non-ordinary agents is surprisingly quite similar to perceiving other minds or believing in other 
unseen entities, germs for example (Gervais, 2013b; Lane & Harris, 2014). In the domain of 
religion, meta-representational ToM has been primarily explored through variations of false 
belief tasks in young children. Around the age of four, with the development of a full meta-
representational theory of mind, children are able to make a variety of mental state and 
knowledge distinctions with this ability. Children’s reasoning about God beliefs often matches 
the implicit responses in adults (for reviews, see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016; Lane 
& Harris, 2014), who represent God as being limited by the same anthropomorphic constraints as 
average humans (J. L. Barrett & Keil, 1996). For example, children believe that God is more 
likely to know another’s desires than their own parents, however they treat God with the same 
human limitations as their parents—being able to hear some things yet not others (Canfield & 
Ganea, 2014). But, in addition to parsing what God or their parents might know (Knight, Sousa, 
Barrett, & Atran, 2004), young children also have a tendency to parse and attribute knowledge to 
animals (Richert & Barrett, 2005) and imaginary friends (Wigger, Paxson, & Ryan, 2013). In 
sum, the development of supernatural agent concepts closely mirrors each stage of development 
in children’s’ mentalizing abilities (c.f., Lane & Harris, 2014; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013).  
Adept at applying their meta-representational ToM, around the age of seven years old, 
children can perceive intentionally communicated messages in otherwise random events (Bering 
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& Parker, 2006). Nonetheless, children at this age still do not seem to appreciate that two mental 
states can conflict and affect behavior (Choe, Keil, & Bloom, 2005), thus they may not be able to 
appreciate that belief in super natural agency is counter to a naturalistic worldview. Both 
religious and nonreligious adults, however, also carry-on this tendency to endow certain classes 
of life events with purposeful, intentional, meaning.  
 
Existential Theory of Mind 
 Bering (2002, 2006, 2011) conceptualizes the EToM as a derived, domain general, 
evolutionary adaptation of human cognition. The EToM is a uniquely human trait, according to 
Bering (2002), having a phylogenetic history that places the precursors for the evolution of this 
capacity within the divergence of hominins from Pan troglodytes. However, he suggests that 
EToM as a fully functioning system shows its appearance with the arrival of full symbolic 
capacity in Homo sapiens, arguably occurring between “30,000 and 60,000 years ago” (Bering, 
2002, p. 9). If religion goes hand in hand with the development of the EToM, then, on Bering’s 
account, religion—or anything worthy of the label—did not exist before the transition to to 
behaviorally modern humans.6  
EToM is an extension of the typical processes of ToM, however rather than functioning 
to predict mental states and actions, it is specified to attribute personal meaning to certain kinds 
of autobiographical experiences (e.g., What was the meaning of this particular event for me?). 
Like other theories of ToM, EToM processes meta-representations—the opaque, copy of a copy 
of a primary representation. However, EToM is focused on existential meaning, in abstract, 
                                                 
6 The notion that there has been some axial point in which anatomically modern humans magically became 
behaviorally modern is highly contested within the archaeological literature (c.f., Gamble, 2013; Lewis-Williams, 
2002; Nowell, 2010). 
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causally opaque situations (Bering, 2003). For example, a recent study with Latino mothers’ of 
autistic children found that, despite having some who attributed this occurrence to purely 
biological factors, many mothers saw their children’s condition as an intentional “message from 
God” (Salkas, Magaña, Marques, & Mirza, 2016). However, it is not just in challenging life 
situations when chance happenings can combine to be perceived as part of some greater 
meaning. For another example, think of the happenstance situation of the flighty bachelor 
running into an old crush from high school at a supermarket 30 years later, only to end up 
settling down and getting married. What were the chances that these two should meet at this 
particular moment in time and after all these years? While there is most certainly a complex 
causal explanation to be had, at some level, this will not be the “go-to” folk intuition. Rather, this 
fortuitous rendezvous is more likely to be seen as the hand of God shepherding his children 
together once more (e.g., Salkas et al., 2016), or the powers of the universe combing just so these 
two old lovers could reignite the flame. These explanations are pregnant with intentional 
meaning that a strictly physical universe, according to Bering, could never account for.  
The few studies that have aimed to capture aspects of EToM—that individuals have a 
tendency to imbue life events in general and some important events in specific, with a telos—
have yielded promising results. Primarily utilizing self-report or open-ended questions, asking 
individuals to report on their level of belief in teleological concepts, such as agentive or non-
agentive “fate” (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014) and “life’s purpose” (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013), 
these studies have suggested that supernatural belief (and even belief in the paranormal) are 
correlated with these tendencies. Only Banerjee and Bloom’s (2014, p. 277) study explicitly 
included atheists in their sample, finding a small percentage who tended to perceive design and 
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purpose in life events, concluding that this teleological perception does not belong to 
supernatural thinking alone, residing instead in “more general social propensities.”  
Heywood and Bering (2014), who also included atheists in their study, utilized semi-
structured interviews to probe for teleological answers in response to questions about 
autobiographical events. The authors measured explicit religious identification, postulating that, 
despite the atheist stance (as they operationalized it) ruling out any type of higher purpose, 
atheists would nonetheless generate intuitive responses that were incompatible with their explicit 
worldview. And while theists generated the highest number of teleological narratives, atheists 
did make some attributions of a higher purpose in their responses. Similar to Banerjee and 
Bloom (2014), Heywood and Bering (2014) conclude that the EToM is an ability shared, to 
varying degrees, regardless of religious identification.  
 
Teleology  
 Alongside the meta-representational ToM, children develop an overactive sense of 
teleology. As discussed in chapter X, this teleological impulse—finding people and occasionally 
objects, appear to “act” on the basis of purposeful intentions—is a core component of ToM. 
Children as young as 2 and 3 years old show a preference for purposeful explanations, finding 
explanations such as “rocks are pointy so you don’t sit on them” more appealing than physical 
causal explanations, “rocks are pointy because stuff builds up over time” (Casler & Kelemen, 
2007; Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004). Although less pronounced, these teleological 
tendencies continue into adulthood (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), appear to be further attenuated by 
cultural input such as education (Casler & Kelemen, 2007), however are still present even in 
physical scientists (Kelemen et al., 2013). Teleological reasoning even bleeds into the minds of 
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nonbelievers (Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015), however appears to be strongest in 
individuals who already hold religious beliefs (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014) and are raised within a 
religious environment (Rottman et al., 2016). This data indicates that while the teleological bias 
is pervasive, it is also widely susceptible to cultural influence and rooted in more general socio-
cognitive tendencies rather than the narrower domain of the religious impulse.  
 
Dualism 
 Similar to teleology, dualism, the perspective that separates mind (or the “soul”) as an 
intentional entity apart from matter, an intentionless object, is another early developing cross-
cultural intuition that underlies religious beliefs (Bloom, 2007). For example, when I lecture on 
the topic of ToM, I show people a picture of a brain and ask them, “what is this a picture of”? Of 
course they respond, “it’s a brain!” However, even in a room full of atheists’ no one ever shouts 
out, “it’s a mind!” This is because the notion that the mind is not the brain is intuitive, perhaps 
leading even some philosophers and cognitive scientists (e.g., Chalmers, 1995, 2007; Searle, 
1980, 2013) to embrace a kind of Cartesian dualism. Nuances in this debate abound (c.f., Lowe, 
2011), but the eliminative materialist position—that the existence of the folk mental states 
processed by the mind, such as beliefs and desires, constitute a radically false scientific account 
of the mind—appears to be the most scientifically tractable and productive account of the mind 
(Churchland, 1981, 1989, 1993, 2007). Nonetheless, that mind is separate from the body may be 
a libel intuition that further enriches supernatural beliefs.  
The development of dualistic intuitions (i.e., intuitive dualism) also appears cross-
culturally (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Huang, Cheng, & Zhu, 2013). For example, both children and 
adults attribute desire, emotional, and other epistemic mental states (e.g., thinking about one’s 
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spouse or knowing they may be angry) to the recently deceased as ghosts and spirits (Bering, 
2002; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Huang et al., 2013). And, most often it is these mental states 
and not psychobiological or perceptual states (e.g., feeling hungry or seeing something) that are 
attributed to the dearly departed (Bering, 2002; Bering, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Huang et al., 
2013; Lindeman, Riekki, & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015). Shtulman (2008) has demonstrated that 
adults attribute psychological properties to religious agents, over and above physical or 
biological properties, however children appear to weigh these aspects equally (also see Shtulman 
& Lindeman, 2016).   
In some contrast to intuitive dualism, reflective dualism is the explicit stance that mind 
and matter are not the same. Again, think about philosopher David Chalmers (2007). Chalmers 
has certainly pondered his place in the universe and with philosophical training, has defended the 
idea that consciousness is irreducible to the physical. This is reflective dualism. Research has 
suggested that confusing “core” knowledge (c.f., Spelke, 2000)—for example, mixing agentive 
properties with physical properties, such as “Stars live in the sky.”—is at the root of not only 
reflective dualism, but also supernatural and paranormal beliefs (Lindeman, Riekki, et al., 2015; 
Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015; Riekki, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2013).  
Importantly, humans are not determined to be unapologetic dualists and individual 
differences have been identified. For example, Lindeman, Riekki, and Svedholm-Hakkinen’s 
(2015) study found at least a small group of “monists” who attribute mental, psychobiological, 
and biological functions only to the brain. And, on the opposite end, the researchers discovered a 
large group of “spiritualists” who attribute these functions not only the brain, but also the mind 
and soul. Although some theoretical debate remains as to whether or not humans are truly 
cognitively capable of being dualists, due to the contributions of offline social cognition to 
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represent agents as embodied (Hodge, 2008, 2011) at the level of the “folk,” research indicates 
that people generally believe that the mind is not the body in life, and even can continue after 
death (also see Lane & Harris, 2014).  
 
Mentalizing  
Mentalizing involves thinking about and attributing mental states to other agents. These 
agents can be human (e.g., I wonder what Ralph does in his free time?), supernatural (e.g., If I 
lose my religion, Allah will be very angry.), or ambiguous (e.g., Hearing a tree limb snap in the 
night and wondering, “who’s there?”). Mentalizing combines some of the core components of 
ToM, mental state attribution.  
Overwhelmingly, women are more likely to be religious than men, as well as have 
superior mentalizing capabilities (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015). Both of these relationships are 
consistently found in the literature (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2012; Rosenkranz & Charlton, 2013). 
In the “earliest” attempt to explore the relationship between mentalizing and supernatural belief, 
across three studies, Norenzayan et al. (2012) found mentalizing to mediate belief in a personal 
God, however each study only had a marginal number of atheists (13.7%, 11.6%, 4%). 
Furthermore, their analyses only compared high and low belief, and found only weak 
relationships to mentalizing. Thus both groups were, methodologically speaking, all theists as 
there was no grouping for atheism or “no belief”. Nonetheless, systemizing alone predicted 
lower god beliefs.  
In a single study, Rosenkranz and Charlton (2013) found mentalizing predicts “religious 
orientation” and systemizing predicts “science acceptance.” And, while there were atheists and 
theists in their sample, it might be assumed that theists were the latter and atheists the former, 
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however the researchers never measured directly compared atheists and theists, only an 
individual’s level of religious orientation or science acceptance. 
Both dualism and to a lesser degree teleological reasoning, have been shown to mediate 
the relationship between mentalizing and supernatural belief (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). 
According to Willard and Norenzayan’s (2013, p. 388) study, which tested for individual 
differences in mentalizing, anthropomorphism, and dualism, found that the relationship between 
these cognitive biases was directional, leading to religious and paranormal belief, and belief in 
life’s purpose, “and not the other way around.” However, all the SEM path relationships in 
Willard and Norenzayan’s study going from mentalizing to these cognitive biases were “either 
weak or non-significant” (Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015, p. 64). In a similar study, 
Banerjee and Bloom (2014) found that while mentalizing predicted teleological reasoning about 
one’s own life, belief in fate, and finding meaning hidden in life events, it failed to predict the 
attribution of life events to God or tendencies for to apply teleology more generally. Lindeman et 
al. (2015) also found a weak relationship from mentalizing ability (and promiscuous teleology) 
to predict supernatural belief, testing this against several other biases, of which, confusing core 
ontological knowledge (e.g., assigning “mental” properties to physical objects) was the single 
best predictor of belief in supernatural purpose. While the researchers did not allow participants 
to report if they were atheist, over 50% of their Finnish sample identified as “non-religious.” 
Having similar methodological limits to other studies I have mentioned, one should not confuse a 
survey identification of “no religion” with having no god beliefs (Lee, 2014). Interestingly, their 
analysis did reveal that individuals with strong mentalizing skills, but with poor understandings 
of physical causality and low systemizing skills professed more supernatural belief than all other 
groups. This is what we would expect given the role of the social brain in human evolution—
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overly mentalistic individuals with poor causal reasoning abilities will hold fairly high levels of 
supernatural beliefs. Nonetheless, other recent studies have continued to find weak relationships 
with mentalizing and supernatural belief (e.g., Reddish et al., 2016; Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016).  
 
 High Functioning Autism, Theory of Mind, and Religious Belief 
Few studies exist examining variation in ToM alongside religiosity, in individuals with 
HFA spectrum disorders. In one of the first studies, Caldwell-Harris et al., (2011) found that 
HFA individuals were more likely to be atheist or agnostic and if they did identify as “religious,” 
they constructed their own religious belief system. In addition, she also found atheists to have 
significantly higher systemizing scores and did not uncover any differences in mentalizing. 
Reddish, Tok, and Kundt (2016) found several significant differences between mentalizing in 
ASC and NT’s in how anthropomorphic they viewed God, or felt closeness to Him, however all 
had small effect sizes. As suggested by others (Bering, 2002, 2011), the image of God possessed 
by ASC individuals may be different from NT’s. For example, Schaap-Jonker, Sizoo, Roekel, 
and Corveleyn (2013) found that the God image of individuals diagnosed with ASC had more 
negative traits and fewer positive traits than their NT group.  
Qualitative approaches, focusing on individual manifestations of religiosity and 
spirituality in ASC individuals, are rare. However, one study, conducted by Visuri (2012), 
utilized semi-structured interviews to probe for the relationship between BAP traits and religious 
views in four persons on the ASC. Given the wide net cast by EToM over existential questions 
(Coleman & Hood, 2015), Visuri (2012, p. 373) uncovered that her participants possess some 
form of existential ponderance, but “they do not tell of coming to any conclusions,” she writes. 
Rather than thorough impairments in mentalizing abilities, the curiosity and reflexivity of the 
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participants may have triggered not disbelief, but instead, a deeper existential mystery. Noting 
this, Visuri (2012) concludes that regardless of the possible differences in mentalizing and EToM 
displayed by ASC individuals, there are substantial cultural influences, which will need to be 
further taken into account in much needed future research.  
 Using the cognitive styles framework—empathizing/mentalizing and 
systemizing/analytic thinking—Lindeman and Lipsanen (2016) recently uncovered 5 subgroups 
each of atheists and theists who differed on aspects of cognitive style. Additionally, Norenzayan 
and Gervais (2013) have suggested four paths to nonbelief, two of which concerns mentalizing 
and analytic thinking. This research suggests that any totalizing attempts to conceptualize a 
binary of cognitive traits characterizing either religious believers or nonbelievers is problematic. 
This data supports an account of belief and nonbelief following an individual differences 
approach to religiosity (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Reddish et al., 2016; 
Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016).  
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CHAPTER VIII. 
 
DIVERSITY OF NONBELIEF 
 
 
The scientific study of nonreligion is still in its infancy, particularly from a psychological 
perspective (Coleman, Hood, & Shook, 2015). The number of atheists measures over half a 
billion worldwide (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Secular and atheistic individuals can even be 
found in predominantly Muslim countries such as Turkey (Sevinc, Coleman, & Hood, In Press; 
Sevinc, Hood, & Coleman, In Press). The vast majority of atheists are deconverts (Fazzino, 
2014; Streib & Klein, 2013). There are “hidden” atheists in the Christian pulpit (Dennett & 
LaScola, 2010) and surrounding the Jewish Ark (Shrell-Fox, 2015)—there are certain to be 
more. Atheists and the nonreligious comprise some of the fastest growing “religious” 
demographics (Twenge, Exline, Grubbs, Sastry, & Campbell, 2015) and are projected to 
maintain this growth (Stinespring & Cragun, 2015). Despite these positive projections of growth, 
perceptions of atheists are negative.  
Widespread stigmatization and prejudice of atheists exists within the public sphere 
(Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; 
Mann, 2015). For example, many state constitutions in the United States officially forbid atheists 
from holding public office, however these laws are no longer enforceable. Research suggest that 
discrimination against atheists is primarily based upon a perceived lack of “moral trust” 
(Gervais, 2013a) and that even exposing individuals to information suggesting our moral sense is 
innate does not reduce this view (Mudd, Naijle, Ng, & Gervais, 2015). Nonetheless, atheists 
appear to lead lives as normal and moral as any other religious group (Coleman & Arrowood, 
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2015; Zuckerman, 2014). However, comparatively little research has been conducted with 
atheists compared to the religious.  
 Over the past century, hundreds of scales have been developed measuring different 
“facets,” “orientations,” or “dimensions” of religiosity (Hill & Hood, 1999). Measurement scales 
appropriate for a secular or nonbelieving person are virtually nonexistent, however recent years 
have seen some developments (e.g., Bradley, 2014; Cragun, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2015; Schnell, 
2015). However, initial survey and experimental research does exist for atheist samples, 
measuring atheism as a nominal variable. This research highlights personality and cognitive 
variation among nonbelievers, as well as their convergence and contrast to religious believers.  
There is now some evidence that compared to theists, atheists and the nonreligious are 
more open to experience, less dogmatic, favor analytic thinking styles over intuitions 
(Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016), and have specific interests in the sciences 
(Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Farias, 2013). Among themselves, atheists also demonstrate differences 
in personality variables. For example, despite individuals overwhelmingly viewing atheists as 
“angry,” this relationship varying as a function of religiosity (Meier, Fetterman, Robinson, & 
Lappas, 2015), research suggests only a small portion of atheists (less than 15%) may have 
higher trait anger (Silver, Coleman, Hood, & Holcombe, 2014). Using an individual difference in 
personality variables approach, Silver, Coleman, Hood, and Holcombe (2014) have uncovered at 
least 6 “Types” of nonbelief, and variation in psychological type has been reported elsewhere 
(Baker & Robbins, 2012; Gibson, 2006). There is a strong intellectual component to atheism 
(Caldwell-Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & Beit-Hallahmi, 2011) and nonbelievers can demonstrate 
cognitive styles that vary on levels of empathizing, mechanistic (systemizing) cognition, autism 
quotient traits, and analytic thinking (Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016). This is because the same 
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processes supporting belief also support nonbelief (Banerjee & Bloom, 2013; Coleman et al., 
2015; Geertz, 2010, 2013). Despite this, paths to atheism have been conceptualized from a deficit 
point of view, finding atheists must be lacking normally functioning brains in explanation for 
their lack of belief.  
 
Atheism and Theory of Mind 
Is not believing in any gods is similar to having a physical disability? While one might 
first laugh at such a provocative statement, perhaps rub their eyes in disbelief, J. L. Barrett 
(2012, p. 203) has suggested precisely this: “Not believing in any sort of gods may prove to be a 
trait that is analogous to not being able to walk.” One of the most important theoretical 
assumptions within CSR literature is that variations in ToM or mentalizing abilities can explain 
diminished or absent god beliefs (i.e. explain nonbelief). In short, it has been suggested that 
atheists may not believe in God because they are “socially disabled” (J. L. Barrett, 2012, p. 85), 
“mind-blind” (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013)7, or have a “malfunction” in their mind-reading 
abilities (Clark & Visuri, In press) that is characterized by mentalizing deficits associated with 
the autism spectrum (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Using the term “male-brained” as a stand-in 
for mentalizing deficits, J. L. Barrett (2012, p. 205) further summarizes this view by suggesting 
that: 
If theory of mind and related social cognition are so critical for theistic belief 
and if severe male-brained people are weak in or lack these social cognitive 
abilities, then we would predict that people who have always found it difficult 
or impossible to believe in any gods might tend to be more male-brained.  
 
                                                 
7 In order to better characterize this suggestion, Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) note that “mind blindness” is only 
one possible cognitive route to nonbelief. However, the other routes they cover are typically out of favor with CSR 
standard accounts, and of no relevance to the current thesis.   
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The theoretical centrality of ToM in explanations of religious (non)belief should not 
outweigh its empirical signature. Do atheists really lack a properly functioning ToM when 
compared to theists and to what extent do males and females vary in ToM functioning and 
supernatural belief? Based on a review of the literature the following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Atheists will score lower than theists on the Mentalistic ToM components of 
intentionality and mental state attribution. 
Hypothesis 2: Atheists will score higher than theists on the selection processor component of 
ToM.  
Hypothesis 3: Atheists will display more BAP traits than theists.  
Hypothesis 4: Sex differences are predicted in both atheist and theist groups on all measures, 
with females scoring higher than males on mentalistic aspects of ToM and social components of 
the BAP.  
Hypothesis 5: ASC (self)diagnoses will be more prevalent among atheists compared to theists. 
Hypothesis 6: Atheists with ASC (self)diagnoses will differ significantly from non-ASC atheists 
on all measures.  
  
  91 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Baron-Cohen (1995) and Leslie’s (1994b) characterization of a theory of mind module 
are combined and specific components of this device are related back to the following measures: 
Rosset (2008) intentionality bias scale [ID/ToBy/ToMM1]; Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) Reading 
the mind in the eyes [ToMM2/ SAM], and the cognitive reflector test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) 
[SP].  
 
Participants and Procedure 
This study received institutional review board approval (exemption, protocol # 3010X) 
from Boston University (BU) and was conducted under the supervision of the principal 
investigator, Dr. Catherine Caldwell-Harris in collaboration with myself, Thomas Coleman. The 
study also received institutional review board approval at the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga (# 16-068), specifically requesting to use this (now) archival data. The data was 
collected through the BU Qualtrics online survey software. Participants were recruited from the 
BU undergraduate psychology majors research pool and by responding to an online posting 
published by The Friendly Atheist blog (http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/) at the 
request of Thomas Coleman. This online posting invited “atheists, theists, and anyone who might 
consider themselves ‘in-between” to respond to an online survey about how personality and 
cognitive styles might influence belief and attributions of intentionality. While it is possible to 
raise some questions regarding the psychological typicality for any theists recruited from a 
predominantly atheist blog (e.g., Did you have theists that were bordering considering, or close 
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to, atheism in your sample?), this interpretation is unlikely. For example, religious individuals do 
subscribe to The Friendly Atheist and this blog is hosted as part of a much larger website 
(Patheos.com), which primarily contains popular theist blogs. In addition, the individuals in the 
theist group all selected statements affirming the existence of God (see, Dawkins theism scale 
below).  
 Compared to theists (N = 103), atheists were intentionally oversampled (N = 2423), in 
order to detect subtle individual differences in traits associated with ASC and specific ToM 
components. The survey was completed in the following order: A brief demographics section, 
the CRT, a measure of religiosity, the Rosset (items were randomized), the BAPQ, the RMTE 
(items were randomized), religion questions and Dawkins theism scale. In addition to the scales 
analyzed in the current study, the survey contained a dimensional measure of religiosity and 
several demographics questions, which are outside of the scope of this thesis and have been 
omitted. All data was analyzed using the SPSS-23 statistical package.  
 This sample analyzed consisted of a total N = 2526 fully completed participant responses. 
The mean age represented in the data set was 39.05 years and 59.6% of the sample identified as 
male. Atheists were intentionally oversampled (N = 2423), in order to detect subtle individual 
differences in traits associated with ASC and specific ToM components in comparison theists (N 
= 103). The atheist group was predominately male (59.6%) and the theist group was 
predominately female (59.2%).  
 
Materials  
ASC conditions question. The survey invited participants to check one or more of the 
following categories if they had: Clinician diagnosed Asperger’s, self-diagnosed, “not sure if I 
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have it or not,” Autism, Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Sensory Integration, and “other.” 
Only the Autism and Asperger’s categories will be utilized in the analyses. 
Broader Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ). The BAPQ is a quantitative measure 
of 3 domain traits as described by Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (2000). 
The subscales for each domain are: aloof personality (e.g., I enjoy being in social situations.), 
rigid personality (e.g., I am comfortable with unexpected changes in plans [reverse scored].), and 
pragmatic language problems (e.g., I find it hard to get my words out smoothly.). All subscales 
invite participants to respond on a six point Likert scale (1, Vary rarely—Very often, 6) how 
much each statement applies to themselves. Although other scales measuring the BAP have been 
utilized in research on religion (e.g., the autism quotient), when these scale are compared with 
each other the BAPQ out performs all the rest (Ingersoll et al., 2011).  
Rosset Intentionality Scale (RIS). The RIS measures one’s tendency towards an 
“intentionality bias” (Rosset, 2008) and will serve as a measure of the intentionality component 
of ToM. It asks participants to infer actions as either “on purpose” or “on accident” in 40 
situations (10 per factor) that are unambiguously intentional (“He buttoned his jacket.”), 
unambiguously accidental (“He poked himself in the eye.”), prototypically accidental (“He hit 
the man with his car”), and neutral/prototypically intentional (“She cut him off driving.”). This 
will be (has been) given to participants without any emphasis on speed, so they are free to take as 
little or as long as they like.  A sum score of correct responses are computed for each category.  
Reading the mind in the eyes test (RTME). The RTME test is a measure that taps into 
subtle differences in the attribution of appropriate mental states (i.e., sadness, joy) using 36 small 
black and white visual cross-sections of the eye region (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001). Participants select the appropriate mental state from 3 other incorrect “foils” and a sum 
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score is computed. This makes calculating a Cronbach’s alpha score extremely difficult, however 
test re-test methodology has established its reliability (Fernández-Abascal, Cabello, Fernández-
Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2013; Vellante et al., 2013). This test is widely used in research on 
ToM in general and ASC in specific, reliably separating individuals with clinical impairments in 
social cognition from NT’s. Furthermore, this test has seen use in previous studies on religion 
(Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, et al., 2011; Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015; 
Norenzayan et al., 2012). 
Cognitive Reflection Test. The CRT (Frederick, 2005) consists of three questions tapping 
into an individual’s preference for analytic thinking compared to intuitive (e.g., A bat and a ball 
cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? While 
the intuitive answer is typically 10 cents, the correct answer is 5 cents. This is a performance 
based measure, developed in the field of behavioral economics, that is correlated with success 
overcoming a number of cognitive biases (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), specifically, 
improbable or conflicting beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; 
Pennycook et al., 2016). Due to this, the CRT is commonly utilized as a measure of “analytic 
thinking” and has never been explicitly operationalized as the SP component of ToM. This is 
unfortunate, because the CRT’s psychometric properties (which taps into a domain general, Type 
2 process, involving the selective inhibition of an intuitive choice for an alternative one) directly 
overlap with the characterization of the SP (c.f., Frederick, 2005; Leslie, 2000; Leslie et al., 
2005; Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). Additionally, the individual 
differences found in CRT performance (Frederick, 2005) closely mirror the predicted pattern of 
variation for ToM ability, male/female sex differences and their associated levels of religiosity 
combined (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; McCauley, 2011). This study will utilize the number of correct 
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CRT responses, as well as the mean time spent attempting the questions for measurement. The 
response time data was captured using using Qualtrics, measured from the first “click” to the last 
“click” on the page.  
Dawkins Theism “Scale.” In Richard Dawkins’ (2006) book, The God Delusion, he 
posits that individuals can fall somewhere on a spectrum of belief in God from being certain of 
His existence to certain of His nonexistence. He provides 7 categories of identification: Strong 
Theist (e.g., I do not question the existence of God; I know he exists), De-Facto Theist, Weak 
Theist, Pure Agnostic, Weak Atheist, De-Facto Atheist, and Strong Atheist (e.g., I am 100% sure 
there is no God.). Measuring levels of (non)religiosity nominally, allowing participants to self-
select the term that best describes their position on God allows for a direct answer to the question 
of ToM variability between atheists and theists. The de-facto and strong theist and atheist 
categories will be collapsed to create 2 master categories: atheists and theists. Questions over 
possible ToM differences in agnostics is beyond the scope of this proposal and they will be 
excluded from the analyses along with the “weaker” belief categories.  
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CHAPTER X. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Hypotheses 1–4: A series of two-way ANOVAs were conducted between religious 
identification (atheist vs. theist) and gender (male vs. female) with each (sub)scale. Residual 
analysis was performed to test for the assumptions of the two-way ANOVA. Outliers were 
assessed by inspection of a q-q plot, normality was assessed using Shapiro-wilk’s normality test 
for each cell design and homogeneity of variances was assessed by Leven’s test. All outliers 
were kept in the data and in cases where residuals were non-normally distributed, skewness and 
kurtosis were within acceptable range (-1.5, +1.5) to allow comparison (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012). (See, table 4. below.) There was homogeneity of variance and equal variance was 
assumed across all tests, except for the performance based measures CRT total, CRT time, 
RMTE and for unambiguously accidental and unambiguously intentional subscales, which 
function as “control” sentences and is expected (Rosset, 2008).  
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Table 4 Sample Variances 
 
Variable N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
RMTE 2444 26.0397 3.71273 -.851 2.361 
Rosset overall 2889 .4713 .09048 -.002 .856 
Unambiguously 
accidental 
2888 .0213 .06881 4.216 
20.795 
Prototypically 
accidental 
2887 .2654 .17487 .647 
.287 
Unambiguously 
intentional 
2887 .9927 .04340 -12.280 
216.022 
Prototypically 
intentional 
2888 .6068 .22570 -.381 
-.311 
BAPQ total 2806 2.9525 .62051 .287 .145 
BAPQ-aloof 
personality 
2707 3.2 .89207 .107 
-.486 
BAPQ-pragmatic 
language 
2712 2.7196 .64971 .520 
.433 
BAPQ rigid 
personality 
2696 2.9343 .74627 .320 
.219 
CRT total 3433 1.2196 1.17476 .332 -1.409 
CRT time 2866 4.2315 .86358 .270 4.260 
 
 
 BAPQ overall: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
(non)religious identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious 
identification F(1, 2503) = .373, p = .542, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .094. There 
was a significant difference between genders F(1, 2503) = 3.876, p = .049, partial 𝜂2 = .002. 
Males had more overall BAPQ traits than females. Observed power was .503. There was no 
significant interaction between religious identification and gender for BAPQ overall score F(1, 
2503) = .013, p = .910, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .051. 
 BAPQ aloof personality: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
(non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious 
identification F(1, 2423) = 30.760, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .013. The atheist group had higher aloof 
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traits than theist group. Observed power was 1.00. There was no significant difference between 
gender F(1, 2423) = 2.782, p = .095, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .385. There was no 
significant interaction between religious identification and gender for BAPQ aloof F(1, .000) = 
.000, p = .988, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .050. 
 BAPQ pragmatic language problems: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between 
religious identification F(1, 2423) = 6.858, p = .009, partial 𝜂2 = .003. The theist group had 
higher pragmatic language problem scores than the atheist group. Observed power was .745. 
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2423) = 8.910, p = .003, partial 𝜂2 = 
.004. Observed power was .847. Males had higher pragmatic language problem scores than 
females. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender F(1, 
2423) = .218, p = .640, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .075. 
BAPQ Rigid personality: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
(non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious 
identification F(1, 2409) = 6.628, p = .010, partial 𝜂2 = .003. The theist group had higher rigid 
personality traits than the atheist group. Observed power was .730. There was no significant 
interaction between gender F(1, 2409) = .007, p = .932, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was 
.051. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender F(1, 2409) 
= .758, p = .384, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .140.  
 RMTE: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious 
identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious identification 
F(1, 2257) = .120, p = .730, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .064. There was no 
significant interaction between gender F(1, 2257) = 2.290, p = .130, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed 
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power was .328. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender 
F(1, 2257) = .075, p = .784, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .059.  
 RIS, overall: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious 
identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious identification 
F(1, 2501) = 1.463, p = .227, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .227. There was a 
significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 5.549, p = .019, partial 𝜂2 = .002. Males 
scored higher than females on the overall RIS. Observed power was .654. There was no 
significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = .432, p = .511, 
partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .101.  
  RIS, unambiguously accidental: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between 
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 11.947, p = .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The theist group 
responded with more “on purpose” answers than the atheist group. Observed power was .933. 
There was no significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 1.984, p = .159, partial 𝜂2 = 
.001. Observed power was .291. There was no significant difference between religious 
identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 1.032, p = .310, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was 
.174.  
 RIS, unambiguously intentional: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between 
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 12.216, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The atheist group 
responded with more “on purpose” answers than the theist group. Observed power was .937. 
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 13.308, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = 
.005. Females responded with more “on purpose” answers than males. Observed power was .954. 
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There was a significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 
11.972, p = .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The male atheists and female theists and atheists responded 
with more “on purpose” answers than the male theists. Observed power was .933. 
RIS, prototypically accidental: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of (non)religious identification and gender on the RIS unambiguously prototypically 
accidental subscale. There was no significant difference between religious identification F(1, 
2501) = .936, p = .333, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .162. There was a significant 
difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 5.345, p = .021, partial 𝜂2 = .002. Males responded with 
more “on purpose” answers than females. Observed power was .637. There was no significant 
difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 1.067, p = .302, partial 𝜂2 = 
.000. Observed power was .178.  
 RIS, prototypically intentional: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was no significant difference between 
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 2.668, p = .103, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .372. 
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 4.302, p = .038, partial 𝜂2 = 
.002. Males responded with more “on purpose” answers than females. Observed power was .545. 
There was no significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 
.210, p = .647, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .074. 
 CRT: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious 
identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious identification F(1, 
2505) = 22.504, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .009. The atheist group had more correct CRT responses 
than the theist group. Observed power was .99. There was a significant difference between 
gender F(1, 2505) = 28.471, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .011. Males had more correct CRT responses 
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than females. Observed power was 1. There was no significant difference between religious 
identification and gender F(1, 2505) = .071, p = .791, partial 𝜂2 = .011. Observed power was 
.058.  
 CRT, time: CRT total response time data was transformed into a normal distribution 
using natural logs. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious 
identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious identification F(1, 
2428) = 6.135, p =.013, partial 𝜂2 = .003. Regardless of whether or not their response was 
correct, the atheist group spent more time attempting to solve the CRT than the theist group. 
Observed power was .697. There was no significant difference between gender F(1, 2428) = 
.804, p =.370, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .146. There was no significant difference 
between religious identification and gender F(1, 2428) = 1.607, p =.205, partial 𝜂2 = .001. 
Observed power was .245. 
Hypothesis 5: A Chi-square was conducted to explore whether or not ASC 
(self)diagnoses would be more prevalent among atheists compared to theists. Of the 2516 cases 
analyzed for the study, 74 individuals reported some diagnoses of ASC (theists N = 5; atheists N 
= 69) and 2452 were non-ASC. A chi-square goodness of fit test was conducted to determine 
whether ASC was overrepresented in atheists and underrepresented in theists. The test indicated 
that the prevalence of ASC did not significantly differ across (non)religious identification (X
2(1) 
= 1.399, p = .237).  
Hypothesis 6: A series of t-tests were conducted to test for differences between ASC 
atheists and Non-ASC atheists on all measures. The BAPQ Aloof and Rigid subscales displayed 
heterogeneity of variances and the “equal variances not assumed” (Welch-t test) column was 
interpreted in the output. This test is robust, allowing for the comparison of groups with unequal 
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variances (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010; Welch, 1947). In order to control for 
the increase in the probability of making a Type I error due to running multiple tests a 
Bonferroni correction was calculated and the significance level was set to p = .004. All effect 
sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d.  
 
Table 5 ASC atheists vs. non-ASC atheists t-tests 
 ASC Non-ASC 
  
 
 N M SD N M SD CI t p d 
RMTE 65 23.923 4.196 2113 26.176 3.534 
-3.131, -
1.375 
-5.032 
< 
.001 
.58 
Rosset overall 69 .462 .089 2350 .473 .089 X X X X 
Unambiguously 
accidental 
69 .013 .057 2350 .018 .063 X X X X 
Prototypically 
accidental 
69 .253 .159 2350 .268 .176 X X X X 
Unambiguously 
intentional 
69 .999 .012 2350 .995 .032 X X X X 
Prototypically 
intentional 
69 .585 .242 2350 .611 .225 X X X X 
BAPQ total 69 3.965 .566 2352 2.922 .593 
.901, 
1.185 
14.415 
< 
.001 
1.8 
BAPQ-aloof 
personality 
67 4.296 .645 2277 3.196 .871 
.939, 
1.261 
13.605 
< 
.001 
1.4 
BAPQ-
pragmatic 
language 
68 3.765 .686 2275 2.678 .617 
.938, 
1.237 
14.260 
< 
.001 
1.7 
BAPQ rigid 
personality 
64 3.816 .957 2265 2.898 .722 
.678, 
1.160 
7.621 
< 
.001 
1.1 
CRT total 69 1.652 1.122 2354 1.466 1.147 X X X X 
CRT time 64 4.117 .665 2282 4.252 .839 X X X X 
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CHAPTER XI. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Cognitive science explains religious (non)belief, in part, due to ToM ability. Indeed, 
without the ability to make inferences about the unseen mental states of others, it is unlikely 
supernatural beliefs would exist (J. L. Barrett, 2004, 2011, 2012; Bering, 2001, 2002). But upon 
reflection, this kind of simple thinking resembles what Dennett (2009) terms a “deepity”—a 
statement that is profoundly true yet utterly trivial. Other examples of deepities include “love is 
just a word” and “the Theory of Evolution is only a theory”. Both of these statements describe 
something true, perhaps even profound, but when put into a broader, more specific, meaningful, 
context, they become trivial. Could the disciplinary mantra, “mentalizing underlies supernatural 
belief” be a deepity? Scholarship on the cognitive and cultural foundations of religious belief 
may comically wish to begin including lengthy, Victorian-esque, subtitles several lines long 
(Norenzayan et al., 2016), in order to better describe claims that are accurate, yet trivial when 
properly contextualized. This manuscript has argued for “religion” as a folk category, like 
“belief,” which while a useful heuristic in many day-to-day pursuits and even scientific research, 
ultimately belies these endeavors. Just like other abstract social representations, such as notions 
of sister/brother hood (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), marriage, governments, and many other 
institutions (Boyer & Petersen, 2012; Searle, 2013), the relationship between ToM and religion, 
may be at such a fundamental level that it is certainly an important, indeed necessary, causal 
variable in the generation, maintenance, and transmission of these representations, but it is not 
sufficient.  
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Atheism, ToM, and the BAP 
The aim of this study was exploratory, it tested several hypotheses on the nature of the 
relationship between ASC traits, gender, ToM, and supernatural (non)belief. Specifically, it 
examined key components of the ToM system—intentionality, mental state attribution, selection 
processor—and three components of the BAP—aloof personality, rigid personality, and 
pragmatic language deficits. Despite being well informed by predictions in the empirical and 
theoretical literature, this study failed to locate many differences where predicted. Out of 48 
separate statistical tests, only 20 detected significant differences. Moreover, where significant 
differences were identified, their practical and theoretical significance in support of robust or 
even weak differences between atheists and theists is called into question. Interestingly, when 
compared to atheists, the theists were significantly higher on two BAPQ subscales (a point that 
will be returned to below). Overall, however, these results actually jibe well with recent studies 
(Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016) and cautionary pleas on the relationship between ToM and other 
cognitive biases and their role in explaining supernatural (non)belief (Lindeman & Svedholm-
Häkkinen, 2016).  
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Table 6   ANOVAS and t-test quick reference sheet 
 
 
Atheist vs. theist 
difference? 
Gender 
difference? 
Interaction? 
ASC atheist vs. 
Non-ASC 
atheist 
RMTE X X X Yes 
Rosset overall X Yes X X 
Unambiguously 
accidental 
Yes Yes X X 
Prototypically 
accidental 
X Yes X X 
Unambiguously 
intentional 
Yes Yes Yes X 
Prototypically 
intentional 
X Yes X X 
BAPQ total X Yes X Yes 
BAPQ-aloof 
personality 
Yes X X Yes 
BAPQ-pragmatic 
language 
Yes Yes X Yes 
BAPQ rigid 
personality 
Yes X X Yes 
CRT total Yes Yes X X 
CRT time Yes X X X 
 
 
The complete absence of differences on the RMTE is curious (except comparing ASC and non-
ASC atheists). However, it is possible that males and atheists utilized systemizing and analytic 
skills in decoding the mental states, thereby masking possible differences in mentalizing (Valla 
& Ceci, 2011). Another possibility, is that when CSR suggests ToM underlies supernatural 
belief, they are referring to ToM at a wholly different level (Reddish et al., 2016), perceiving 
minds and intentionality where there is none (Gervais, 2013b).  
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Nonetheless, super natural belief (like nonbelief) is multiply determined (Banerjee & 
Bloom, 2013; McCauley, 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2016), with 
cognitive variables being only a (substantial?) component. As Norenzayan et al.(2016, p. 54) 
argue, “therefore, we should not expect overwhelming effect sizes from cognitive variables alone 
on religious beliefs.” While this is certainly an agreeable and humbling point, the effect sizes 
found in the current study—when and where they occur—wouldn’t seem to meet even the 
marginal differences predicted by this view. For example, in the current study, the effect size 
showing atheists score higher than theists on only one BAP trait (aloof personality) was d = .013. 
In other words, the variance present in the atheist and theist samples overlaps with one another 
by roughly 99.6%. Despite the fairly small and often ambiguous empirical literature surrounding 
ToM and supernatural (non)belief, which can be common for the early stages of inquiry into any 
topic (Norenzayan et al., 2016), there are reasons to begin hedging bets that there is any 
straightforward, meaningful, relationship between BAP traits or ToM that will be uncovered by 
survey research—especially since (non)belief is multiply determined.  
All effect sizes in the current study were small, sans the differences between ASC 
atheists and non-ASC atheists. When compared to theists, atheists do not appear to have 
mentalizing deficits. However, ASC atheists did score over a half standard deviation below non-
ASC atheists on mentalizing, and almost two standard deviations above non-ASC atheists on 
BAP trait characteristics. Thus, the strongest difference identified in this study suggests that ASC 
atheists differ markedly from non-ASC atheists.  
 While the ASC spectrum is often characterized by reduced religious belief, aspects of the 
psychoses spectrum are related to increased religious belief (Gervais, 2013b; Wlodarski & 
Pearce, 2016). A blurry distinction between schizophrenia and autism has haunted psychiatry 
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since both were identified in the 20th century (Crespi, 2011b). From a social brain perspective, 
autism and psychoses may place the atheist and the theist on fairly level playing field. If the 
significant differences but marginal effect sizes are interpreted by others as having some strong 
theoretical relationship to expected variation in BAP, then it is important to emphasize that 
theists, and not just atheists, scored higher than one another on different components of the BAP. 
In fact, Crespi (2011b) suggests that the BAPQ, captures some positive symptomologies of 
psychoses.  
Schizophrenia and autism are not “real,” “natural,” categories (Crespi, 2011b). Of the 
many adaptations provided by the social brain in human evolution, mentalizing skills and the 
capacity for analytic thought are key (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005). And while the literature 
is replete with connections between autism and atheism or psychoses and religion, it remains 
largely unconnected to informed discussions on the relationship between these psychiatric 
categories, or rather, their non-natural kind and diffusion into normality and adaptive variation 
under an evolutionary model.  
This study suggests that atheists do not have deficits applying intentionality and 
interestingly, they seem to be fairly judicious and discerning in their application of intentionality 
where appropriate. For example, when compared to the atheist group, the theist group over-
attributed intentionality in ambiguous situations (e.g., “She cut him off driving.”) and under-
attributed intentionality in situations that most would consider fairly intentional (e.g., “She baked 
a cake.”). This is in line with recent data suggesting that application of intentionality, teleology 
rather, is better controlled by atheists (Järnefelt et al., 2015) and that nonreligious contexts may 
encourage better tuning, better control (Rottman et al., 2016). After all, these kinds of 
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mechanisms are learning mechanisms (H. C. Barrett, 2015), being open to and requiring 
testimony and contextual influence.  
The differences in atheist vs. theist applications of intentionality is also in line with data 
suggesting that confusing ontological properties (i.e., applying intentionality to intention-less 
objects or events) is a better predictor of supernatural belief than mentalizing ability (Lindeman, 
Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015). It is important to consider that the “positive” symptoms of 
schizophrenia concern the over extension of intentionality and mental states, whereas the RIS 
taps into the ability to inhibit the application of intentionality as an adaptive human default, 
explaining most any happening on earth (and surely Heaven). The “negative” symptoms of 
schizophrenia concern deficits in social responsiveness and aspects of language manipulation 
(Ochoa et al., 2012).  
The female trend towards religiosity and male trend towards atheism is supported by this 
data. However, given the research area is in its infancy, the various differences demonstrated by 
theists and atheists on these measures are difficult enough to interpret that bringing gender into 
the picture appears to complicate things even more—perhaps. To my knowledge, the RIS has 
never been explored from a gender/sex differences perspective. In fact, it is a rather new measure 
that has not seen much use to date, presumably due to this newness. It has however, been used in 
a study of schizophrenia patients and a control group (Peyroux, Strickland, Tapiero, & Franck, 
2014). While the researchers did not explore any possible sex differences, the sample of 
schizophrenia patients demonstrated an intentionality bias above the control group in every 
condition. Moreover, the researchers found the negative symptoms related most to attributions of 
intentionality. In terms of the social brain continuum for these adaptive functional traits (Crespi, 
2011b), again, the negative symptomology of schizophrenia appears to be expressed most 
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strongly in males (Ochoa et al., 2012), these negative symptoms overlap with the symptomology 
of ASC (Crespi & Badcock, 2008), and males are over represented in ASC (Baron-Cohen & 
Belmonte, 2005). The BAPQ may capture some of the disorganized, negative, symptoms of 
schizophrenia. The present study demonstrated that males had more overall BAPQ traits when 
compared to females. The interpretation of ASC and schizophrenia as key variables of the social 
brain, contributing to sex differences and differences in supernatural (non)belief, possibly 
affected by ToM modular functioning, was not explicitly tested in the present study. However, in 
light of other recent studies exploring psychoses and schizotypy traits, ASC, and supernatural 
belief (Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016; Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016), this remains a plausible, but 
tangled path, to explaining differences in supernatural belief from a social brain perspective.  
Whereas males performed worse at inhibiting intentionality compared to females, they 
demonstrated an advantage at inhibiting intuitive, yet incorrect, responses on the CRT. This fits 
with research indicating that on average, males appear to favor analytic cognitive styles (Baron-
Cohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012). Furthermore, males were overrepresented in the atheist 
sample for the current study and the atheists outperformed theists, and spent more time reflecting 
over the CRT problems regardless of their response. For the absence of differences between ASC 
atheists and non-ASC atheists, it may be that they are more similar in analytic thinking styles to 
one another, while differing markedly in mentalizing abilities and BAP traits.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Sample size may have been one possible limitation, as the ratio of atheists to theists or 
gender in the theist category, may have yielded some serendipitous results. However, there is no 
single trend for how the variables measured here should play out empirically and future studies 
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should examine gender differences whenever possible. It is possible that administering the RIS 
and RMTE with speeded instructions would produce further differences and larger effect sizes. 
Furthermore, while self-report, correlational methodology may be highly informative at some 
levels of inquiry (e.g., Streib & Hood, 2016), it can be wholly remiss at other levels, as only a 
small portion of mental processes are available for introspection (Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke, 
2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Future studies should look for alternative ways to measure ToM, 
drawing from the wide array of social cognitive tasks and experimental paradigms utilized within 
the cognitive sciences as whole, and move beyond seeking correlations with the RMTE and self-
report measures of empathizing. Another possible limitation is that the language in the informed 
consent, inviting participants to complete a survey on how “personality and cognitive styles 
might influence religious belief and attributions of intentionality,” may have directly tipped 
individuals off as to the studies purpose. Future studies must seek to include not only 
measurements of religiosity as a dimensional construct (which has been the norm), but measure 
supernatural (non)belief using implicit measures, alongside nominal categories of identification, 
when exploring different variables in CSR. This should help to elucidate not only scientific 
knowledge, but provide a more accurate presentation of this data to the general public. 
Individuals always identify their “beliefs” nominally at the folk level and do not use mean scores 
on dimensional religiosity scales to reply to the question “what are your (non)religious beliefs?”  
 The primary purpose of this study has been to test for social-cognitive differences 
between atheist and believers. The role of ToM in explaining supernatural (non)belief is 
emphasized to various degrees and in differing contexts depending on what literature is 
consulted. This mirrors the point that CSR does not have a unified set of questions, 
methodologies, and constructs. It does not, currently, comprise a stable research program with 
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clear and well defined objectives and tools to reach them (Coleman, 2013; Jong, 2014). Although 
it has been predicted that atheists may have deficits in ToM, the current data does not support 
this hypothesis.  
In closing, it is important to introduce a distinction that has been implicit up until this 
point in the study. The difference between design space and phenotypical space is important to 
understand when explaining variation in the social brain (H. C. Barrett, 2015). Design space is 
the area where invariant, hill climbing, fitness increasing, evolutionary “designs,” can be acted 
upon by natural selection. The ToM system exists in the design space (H. C. Barrett, 2015). The 
design space is tethered to the phenotypic space, which concerns fitness relevant outcomes 
exhibiting wide variation in a given environment. Variation in phenotypic space is always 
expected and indeed necessary for evolution to work at all. Meaning in life is a high level, 
adaptive, function of ToM (Bering, 2011), which represents the phenotypic space, within which, 
humans develop in virtue of their species typical adaptation. For "religion," we might say that 
meaning making is the central feature (Coleman, Silver, & Hood, 2016; Paloutzian & Park, 
2013). Thus natural selection may not favor “religion” or “religious traits” per se, but instead 
favor the construction of a meaningful worldview and existence—the will to meaning (Frankl, 
1962)—that different individuals pursue in different ways. “Religious beliefs” can be “replaced” 
(Farias, 2013). There is evidence in support of this view, demonstrated by the curvilinear 
relationship between religious belief and wellbeing/health (Galen, 2015). As Galen (2015, p. 63) 
describes the data, “it is beneficial to have a coherent worldview and to engage in regular 
meaningful interactions with others who share this view in a supportive environment that allows 
for prosocial engagement with the broader community.”  
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Phenotypic space should not be confused with “design space” (H. C. Barrett, 2015). A 
“religious phenotype” should not be confused with the possible design space of an evolutionary, 
fitness relevant, adaptive complex, or mechanism(s) that places a premium on meaning, making 
and finding meaning in life. Carving up the phenotypic space can be done in, potentially, 
countless ways and this presents “a kind of frame problem, but not for [natural] selection—for 
us” (H. C. Barrett, 2015, p. 174). Thus, the correlations between mentalizing and “religion” will 
indubitably remain mixed and weak, especially if atheists and other nonreligious eschew 
supernatural representations or beliefs in favor of other, equally counter intuitive, fantastical 
ones, or meaningful ones (Coleman et al., 2016; Farias, 2013; Visuri, In Prep). There is a natural 
world to be discovered and measured, but it is always done so without the “epistemological 
grace” (Bloor, 2007) present in broad conceptualizations of “religion” and narrow 
conceptualizations of “science.” There are more things in heaven and earth than have been 
dreamt of in an evolutionary cognitive science of religion up until this point and perhaps it will 
take an evolutionary cognitive science of atheism to explore them further.  
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